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Markets are becoming more integrated.  Whilst governments have limited influence 
over this process, they can hasten or hinder the pace of integration and will need to 
respond to the implications of integration.  This paper provides a framework for 
thinking about the benefits and costs of market integration.  It analyses how cross 
border flows of goods, services, capital and labour affect the living standards of New 
Zealanders in terms of both productivity and incomes as well as other, broader, 
aspects of living standards.  Particular attention is paid to the areas of spatial 
economic analysis and national sovereignty and identity. 
 
Governments must consider a number of factors when thinking about their stance on 
integration.  Further economic integration promises economic benefits for New 
Zealanders in terms of greater productivity and higher incomes.  One risk, however, is 
that with increasingly free factor flows, government pursuit of integration may increase 
the risk of activity relocating offshore.  The evidence on the overall effect of integration 
on income distribution is unclear, however we do know that there will be winners and 
losers.  Decision-making power and feelings of identity seem to be important 
components of well-being – integration brings with it both risks and opportunities in 
these areas, as pressure is put on traditional forms of governance and identity, and 
new forms develop.  Deciding how the costs and benefits of integration stack up 
ultimately involves a number of value judgements – the paper provides a framework 
and a summary of empirical evidence to help inform those judgements. 
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1. Introduction 
Markets are becoming more integrated.  Whilst governments have limited 
influence over this process, they can hasten or hinder the pace of integration and 
will need to respond to the implications of integration.  This paper provides a 
framework for thinking about the benefits and costs of market integration.  It 
analyses how cross border flows of goods, services, capital and labour affect the 
living standards of New Zealanders in terms of both productivity and incomes as 
well as other, broader, aspects of living standards.  Particular attention is paid to 
the areas of spatial economic analysis and national sovereignty and identity. 
 
2. Integration 
Market Integration occurs when two or more economies function as a single 
market.  It is likely to be evidenced by high flows of goods, services, capital and 
labour and convergence of prices. 
 
Policy Openness and Integration are means governments might use to encourage, 
impede or direct market integration.  Openness involves goods, services, capital 
and labour being free to move across borders and is a necessary condition for 
market integration.  It is evidenced by lack of barriers to cross border flows.  
Policy integration is evidenced by similarity or compatibility of policy settings 
between countries. 
 
Even with high policy integration, market integration may not occur because of 
lack of social integration.  Differences in culture, language and values make it 
unlikely that two economies will function completely as a single market. 
 
3. Analytical  Framework 
We adopt two conceptual windows for analysis.  The first is the traditional ‘New 
Zealand as a nation’ view, where the world is divided into sovereign nations with 
borders that clearly differentiate each from the rest of the world.  The second is 
a newer ‘New Zealand as a region’ perspective, where the world can be viewed as 
a series of concentric groupings, starting with the individual and moving out to 
international groupings including all of humanity.  We find that removing the 
focus from the nation state, as in the ‘New Zealand as a region’ analysis, reveals 
the implications of spatial location to a much greater degree and provides a new 
view of the effects of openness and integration. 
 
4.  Integration, Incomes and Productivity 
The key to higher incomes is productivity.  Higher productivity means that more 
goods and services can be produced from the same amount of resources and 
effort.  As output increases, so too do incomes and employment.  Productivity is 
therefore central to living standards. 
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What improves productivity? 
Productivity results from high quality decision-making about the use of valuable 
assets.  We identify seven mechanisms through which openness and integration 
may affect productivity: resource allocation; scale, scope and specialisation; 
technological advance; accumulation of human capital; accumulation of physical 
capital; firm organization, management practices and work arrangements; and 
plant/firm turnover. 
 
Importantly, there is also a spatial dimension to productivity.  The agglomeration 
of resources and production in a particular location can improve productivity as 
greater density leads to lower transport costs, greater specialisation of 
production and labour, labour market pooling effects and knowledge spillovers. 
 
While domestic policy has an influence over the productivity-improving 
mechanisms, and the spread of activity across space, openness is also 
important.  For smaller countries, such as New Zealand, openness may assume 
greater significance than it would for a larger country that suffers less from 
market-size and resource constraints. 
 
What effect do cross border flows have? 
Looking at the theory on cross border flows of goods, services, capital and labour 
through the ‘New Zealand as a nation’ lens, we find integration generally yields 
productivity improving effects.  However, looking at New Zealand with a spatial 
perspective highlights some additional risks as well as benefits of integration.  In 
particular, capital and labour could move out of New Zealand to more 
agglomerated places, in search of the higher productivity and wages associated 
with density.  While these firms and workers may be more productive offshore, 
the benefits of their productivity improvements are lost to New Zealand. 
 
From the literature we identify four factors that are key in estimating the size of 
the ‘spatial’ risks of integration.  The factors are technology, critical 
mass/agglomeration, absolute advantage and border effects. 
 
1.  Will technology reduce the need to be in an agglomeration to tap into 
productivity benefits, and so make it easier for firms to locate in the 
periphery? 
 
2.  Are firms able to find suitable levels of density for their needs in New 
Zealand cities and towns, or do they have to go offshore to access that 
density and its benefits? 
 
3.  Integration will push countries’ pattern of specialisation towards those 
activities where they have an absolute advantage – what are the 
implications for the level and type of activity that New Zealand might 
sustain in the future? 
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4.  ‘Border effects’ can be thought of as less explicit barriers to integration 
which place an upper limit on the amount of activity that flows out of a 
country – how will these operate in New Zealand? 
 
More empirical work around the mobility of firms and people would shed 
valuable light on these issues. 
 
Empirical evidence 
At a broad level, the empirical evidence on the effect of openness and integration 
on growth and productivity is mixed.  Cross-country regressions tend to find 
positive relationships but there are concerns over the robustness of the 
methodology.  More specific case studies of countries or industries tend to 
support openness. 
 
5.  Integration and Income Distribution 
A classic critique of openness and globalisation is that they cause the 
distribution of income to become more unequal.  Income distribution in New 
Zealand has widened over the past two decades.  Part of this may be due to 
increased economic integration, although it is very difficult to disentangle from 
the many other factors influencing income distribution.  International evidence 
has attributed perhaps 5 to 20 percent of the change in the distribution of 
earnings to trade. 
 
Although the effect of integration on the overall distribution of income is unclear, 
trade liberalisation is likely to change the position of individuals and groups 
within the distribution, and result in winners and losers.  Consumers will benefit, 
through access to lower priced goods.  Costs are likely to be concentrated on 
relatively small groups of workers in sectors that are no longer competitive. 
 
A key question is: are the losers permanently disadvantaged, or is the dislocation 
a relatively temporary one?    If labour markets adjust rapidly, through people 
moving or retraining or both, the effect of the shock will be temporary.   
Government may still want to consider temporary assistance to help people cope 
with the effects of integration.  For some the shock may be permanent and they 
may not be able to recover.  We need to study more closely mechanisms of 
l a b o u r  m a r k e t  a d j u s t m e n t  i n  o r d e r  t o  k n o w  w h a t  s o r t  o f  p o l i c y  r e s p o n s e  i s  
appropriate. 
 
6.  Integration and Decision Making 
Sovereignty 
There is a concern that national sovereignty – the decision-making power of 
nation states – is diminished in an increasingly integrated and global world. 
 
One facet of the concern is that increasing cross border flows of capital and 
labour generate economic pressures that place limits on domestic policies.  To 
some degree global capital markets do limit choices.  This may not be a bad  
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thing if it supports domestic policy and binds commitment from successive 
governments.  More fundamentally, sovereignty does not require limitless 
choices.  Nations have always operated within the parameters of the options 
actually open to them and the pressures upon them.  In a changing world these 
options and pressures have changed, but the effect on sovereignty is unclear. 
 
Another focus for concern is that the increasing trend toward international 
decision-making represents a transfer of power from nation states to 
international organisations, and therefore harms national sovereignty.  Again, 
use of the concept sovereignty is problematically imprecise.  Signing up to 
international norms sets parameters on domestic policy.  It will therefore only be 
undertaken for a greater expected benefit.  This may amount to a loss of 
sovereignty (in the same sense that signing a contract limits an individual) but 
the real question is whether the benefits to New Zealand outweigh the costs of 
signing.  Developing a framework or taxonomy for how we think about the costs 
and benefits of international cooperation is an important area for further work. 
 
Levels of governance 
If we change our perspective to ‘New Zealand as a region’ we see that there are a 
number of different possible levels of decision-making, and the nation state is 
only one.  Rather than trying to decide when New Zealand should give up some 
of its sovereignty to international fora, the question can then be recast as an 
issue about subsidiarity: at what level of governance should decision-making be 
carried out. 
 
It may then be possible to apply the principles that guide decisions of devolution 
to lower levels of government, to decisions of ‘devolution up’, to international 
cooperation.  The paper discusses how the principles of balanced, informed and 
cost effective decision-making might be applied in the international context. 
 
7.  Integration and Identity 
Identity, a sense of who we are, seems to be important to us.  There is a 
multitude of ways that we define ourselves; national identity is one that has been 
particularly powerful.  To the extent that we value it, national identity represents 
a limiting parameter for policy.  Policy integration can only occur to the degree 
that people feel comfortable with it. 
 
Nevertheless, there are a number of points to keep in mind.  Firstly, identity is 
dynamic.  Identity and culture have always evolved over time.  It may be the 
rapid speed of evolution in culture and identity that causes us particular 
dislocation and concern.  Secondly, change can be beneficial in terms of opening 
New Zealand to new ideas and different perspectives, which may make us more 
tolerant as well as innovative.   Finally, national identity can also be a powerful 
negative force when directed against those identified as not belonging. 
 
The challenge for the future is: how do we foster an evolving sense of identity in a 
world of increasing mobility and merging of cultural influence? 
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8.  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
We have identified costs and benefits of integration across goods, services, 
capital and labour markets in terms of both material, and less tangible, aspects 
of living standards.  A simple calculus of the relative weights of various 
considerations is not possible because it involves empirical uncertainties and 
political judgements. 
 
Integration is good for productivity.  However, much of the analysis about the 
productivity advantages of integration hinges on how seriously we view the risk 
that economic activity will locate offshore as factor markets free up, and how 
much we can influence this.  A particular development priority is work aimed at 
understanding the nature of capital and labour mobility between New Zealand 
and other countries.  
 
Concerns about income distribution centre on the fact that some will suffer as a 
result of a changed environment.  How much of a problem this is may depend, to 
a large degree, on the speed and nature of labour market adjustment.  Research 
on labour market adjustment in New Zealand is another area for further work. 
 
At the centre of the analysis lie matters of value, which cannot be resolved by 
applying economic, or other, arguments.  Are we aiming to maximise the welfare 
of residents or citizens?  Do we value places as well as people?  What does it 
mean to be a New Zealander?  These sorts of questions concern the preferences 
and attitudes of New Zealanders and should be vigorously debated in the public 
sphere. 
 
This work provides new perspectives to apply to policy problems.  It reminds us 
of the importance of clearly identifying goals and objectives and making linkages 
across policy areas.  It highlights the need to distinguish between what we can’t 
control and must simply respond to, and where we do have choices.  It raises 
questions such as: how do we think more clearly about the benefits and costs of 
being different?; and how do we think more clearly about the benefits and costs 
of signing up to international agreements? 
 
Objectives canvassed in the paper now need to be combined with practical 
considerations to determine what might be desirable and achievable in policy 
terms.  
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1.   Introduction 
1.1 Context 
Integration is occurring.  Every day individuals and businesses are making 
decisions and taking actions that cross national borders.  In this environment the 
government has some degree of influence over the pace and nature of 
integration, but by no means total control.  Policy can oil the wheels of 
integration, or put sand in the wheels; it cannot drive the machine.   
 
Government roles include: 
 
•  setting the environment for openness unilaterally, eg setting tariff levels, 
immigration rules, statements on the desirability or otherwise of foreign 
investment, and exchange rate policy; 
•  engagements with other countries – this involves choices about how much 
and where policy resources and discretionary powers are to be deployed, 
eg deciding who to pursue integration with, whether bilaterally, regionally 
or multilaterally; what agreements should cover; and what sectors should 
be prioritised; 
•  domestic policies to manage the consequences of integration, eg assisting 
with adjustment for workers and regions affected by changes. 
 
The policy areas pertaining to these three roles are numerous.  External 
economic strategy can, most broadly, be understood as encompassing all topics 
relevant to the cross border flows of goods, services, capital and people.   
Thinking about external economic goals at a broad level will help us to identify 
linkages between various areas of external economic policy as well as provide a 
systematic basis for allocating limited resources, making trade offs and 
prioritising policy initiatives. 
 
It should also assist us in determining the relative importance of integration in 
achieving higher living standards compared to domestic policy, and ensure that 
domestic and external policy settings are aligned. 
 
There are costs and benefits of any course of action, including changing nothing.  
However the costs of the status quo often become starker in an environment of 
crisis.  How likely we are to change our external economic strategy depends on 
how well we think we are doing with our current policy settings.  We live in a 
dynamic environment and things can quickly move on and off the agenda. 
 
1.2  What the paper does 
The paper provides an analytical structure for clarifying external economic goals, 
by discussing the benefits and costs of market integration.  It analyses how cross 
border flows of goods, services, capital and labour affect the living standards of 
New Zealanders in terms of both monetary aspects of living standards 
(productivity and incomes) as well as other, broader, values. 
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Many of the arguments about the benefits and costs of integration will be 
familiar to economists and others.  Nevertheless it is worth drawing them 
together in a simple and clear way.  Other aspects of the analysis will be less 
familiar: particular attention is paid to the perspectives of spatial economic 
analysis and national sovereignty and identity. 
 
Most of the discussion in this paper centres on the effects of market integration.  
It aims to inform the question of how much integration is desirable for New 
Zealand; in other words, what the goals and objectives of external economic 
strategy should be.  Issues about the mix of policy instruments that will best 
help us achieve our objectives are secondary, and contingent upon being clear 
about what we are aiming for.  An in-depth treatment of policy is outside the 
scope of this paper.  However, in order to remind the reader of the way in which 
thinking about objectives matters for policy, we have peppered the discussion 
with boxes containing illustrations and examples of relevant policy questions.   
The next step is to apply the insights in the paper to policy areas. 
 
The paper was written in conjunction with another: Facts about Economic 
Integration: How Integrated is New Zealand with the Rest of the World?, by Vicki 
Plater and Megan Claridge (2000).  Plater and Claridge is an empirical paper, 
which provides comparative data about New Zealand’s current level of market 
and policy integration with the rest of the world.  The paper concludes that New 
Zealand has a relatively high level of integration with the global economy.  The 
widespread perception, however, that New Zealand is a great deal more open and 
integrated than the rest of the world is not supported.  We are broadly similar to 
other advanced economies in both openness of policies and integration of 
markets, and significantly less integrated than other small economies.  New 
Zealand started opening comparatively recently.  The perception that we are 
‘leading the bunch’ may have arisen due to the rapid liberalisation required to 
catch up with other advanced economies and overcome the burden of distance.  
It is hoped that both these papers will inform a discussion about the objectives 
and future directions of New Zealand’s external economic strategy and provide a 
platform for further work. 
 
1.3  Structure of the paper 
The paper is structured as follows. 
 
•  Section Two introduces the notion of integration and distinguishes 
market, policy and social integration. 
 
•  Section Three provides a framework for thinking about the benefits and 
costs of further integration in terms of how it contributes to raising the 
living standards of New Zealanders.  We also introduce a new perspective 
on the nation state. 
 
•  Section Four analyses how cross border flows of goods, services, capital 
and labour affect productivity and incomes.   
 
•  Section Five discusses how integration might affect income distribution.    
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•  Section Six looks at the relationship between integration and national 
sovereignty.   
 
•  Section Seven discusses integration and identity. 
 
We draw the threads of the preceding discussions together into conclusions and 
identify questions for further work in Section Eight.  This section also discusses 
how the ideas in the paper influence the way we think about policy. 
 
We begin by clarifying what is meant by integration. 
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2.   Integration 
The choice of ‘integration’ as an organising concept reflects the view that 
external economic strategy covers a wide range of policy areas.  Discussion in 
terms of ‘trade policy’, ‘competition policy’, ‘immigration policy’ and so on risks 
becoming immersed in detail and missing broader perspectives and insights.   
Since we are interested in informing external economic objectives at the most 
fundamental level we will adopt this broad perspective. 
 
Integration is a relational term: it lacks meaning separate from discussion of 
what is being integrated.  As in Plater and Claridge (2000) we distinguish three 
dimensions of integration: market integration, policy openness and integration 
and social integration. 
 
2.1 Market  integration 
In this paper we are primarily interested in market integration. 
 
Market integration between two economies occurs when they function as a single 
market.  Integrated markets will not sustain price differences for very long; any 
difference will be arbitraged away through quantity and price movements.   
Goods markets, for instance, are integrated if people in different regions have 
access to the same goods at similar prices and trade in these goods occurs 
between regions.
1  If markets are integrated we would expect to see mobility 
(labour moving between countries, goods trade, capital flows etc) and relatively 
quick price convergence (wages equalising, similar goods prices in different 
areas).  For two countries with integrated markets, a shock in one country will 
quickly flow through into the other by price movements and flows.  If markets are 
not integrated we would expect to see little or no mobility, and no, or very slow, 
price convergence. 
 
We focus on the goods, services, capital and labour markets.  These markets are 
not independent of each other.  If all markets between two countries were 
integrated then we would observe rapid adjustment through both product and 
factor markets.  However, it is often the case that some markets are more 
integrated than others because of restrictions on flows in certain areas (eg, 
capital controls, immigration restrictions).  In this situation adjustment follows 
the path of least resistance: flows and prices respond quickly in the market that 
is the most integrated, leaving the other less integrated markets heading toward 
price convergence gradually over time. 
 
One complication is that while the presence of flows is evidence for integration, 
the absence of flows is not conclusive proof of lack of integration.  Lack of 
mobility may indicate lack of market integration, or it may indicate an integrated 
market that is in equilibrium.  We can only tell which of these scenarios is true 
by studying price behaviour and flows after a shock to one location – if we still do 
not observe mobility after a differential shock we can infer that the markets are 
not integrated.  To fully test market integration we would need to undertake 
                                            
1   Coleman (1999)  
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more targeted work looking at price behaviour over time, particularly in response 
to shocks.   
 
It is worth noting, however, that even within a country markets may not be fully 
integrated.  It is important to keep this in mind when considering how integrated 
we might aim for our markets to be in an international context.   
 
2.2  Policy openness and integration 
Government policy may affect the degree and nature of market integration. 
 
Policy openness allows cross border flows to occur.  It implies a lack of barriers 
to market integration.  That goods, services, capital and labour are free to move 
across borders is a necessary condition for market integration.  However it is not 
sufficient: even if policies are extremely open, flows may not occur for other 
reasons.  Openness implies the potential for market integration to be achieved. 
 
Policy integration refers to the level of similarity or compatibility between policy 
settings in two countries.  Policy integration will be one means by which 
governments might encourage market integration and lack of policy integration 
one explanation for lack of market integration.  If, say, systems of health 
regulations and standards are similar between two countries this is likely to 
facilitate trade in the goods market to which these standards relate.  If countries 
recognise each other’s occupational regulations then integration in the service 
and labour markets is likely to be higher. 
 
These two terms overlap and blur together to some degree.  Difference in policy 
settings, for instance, is often referred to as a ‘behind the border’ barrier 
impeding openness.  The aim is not to attempt a scientific taxonomy of classes 
of government policy but rather to distinguish clearly between events in the 
market (flows, price movements) and policy instruments designed to affect those 
events. 
 
Dimensions of policy openness and integration include: 
 
•  Tariffs and non-tariff barriers; 
•  Regulations and common institutions regarding, for example: 
-  trade in services 
-  standards (eg on health and safety, environment, occupational 
licensing) 
-  competition policy and legal systems 
-  transport and communication (aviation, shipping, 
telecommunications, postal) 
•  Trade agreements and membership of international organisations; 
•  Monetary policy; 
•  Fiscal policy; 
•  Investment rules; 
•  Immigration policy;  
•  Political arrangements.  
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Policy integration is a particularly difficult area because many policy settings will 
have several objectives.  Competition policy, for example, rests on a separate 
body of analysis about what is good for New Zealand domestically and this may 
not sit comfortably with the objective of increasing market integration 
internationally, if it turns out that this is also good for New Zealand.  Monetary 
union with another country may promote market integration but will reduce an 
individual country’s control over monetary policy as a tool to guide the macro-
economy.  In cases such as these our best policies from a purely domestic 
standpoint may conflict with policies that will best capture the benefits of 
integration.  A key question is when do we sacrifice our first best domestic 
policies in order to attain better policy integration internationally? 
 
The objectives of policy openness and integration hinge on what our objectives 
are with regard to market integration.  The bulk of this paper informs the debate 
on the optimal level of market integration.  It will be a further question which 
policy instruments and what level of policy openness and integration will best 
achieve our optimal level of market integration.  Policy is discussed briefly in the 
final section of the paper; it is hoped that follow-on work will address these 
issues in more detail. 
 
2.3 Social  integration 
Policy integration will not be the sole determinant of market integration between 
two countries.  The level of social integration is also likely to be important.  For 
example, labour flows are more likely to occur between countries that share 
similar languages, cultures and value systems.  There is evidence that this may 
also be true of trade flows.  These less explicit ‘social’ barriers to trade limit the 
amount of market integration that can be achieved even with perfect policy 
integration.  Policy integration may be able to increase the level of social 




Market integration occurs when two economies function as a single market.  It 
is likely to be evidenced by high flows of goods, services, capital and labour 
and convergence of prices. 
 
Policy openness and integration are means governments might use to 
encourage market integration.  Openness involves goods, services, capital and 
labour being free to move across borders and is a necessary condition for 
market integration.  It is evidenced by lack of barriers to cross border flows. 
Policy integration is evidenced by similarity or compatibility of policy settings 
between countries. 
 
Even with high policy integration, market integration may not occur because of 
lack of social integration.  Differences in culture, language and values make it 
unlikely that two economies will function completely as a single market. 
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3.   Analytical Framework 
3.1  Higher living standards for New Zealanders 
We base our analysis on the premise that the ultimate objective of policy is the 
promotion of higher living standards for New Zealanders.  Our question is: what 
degree of integration with other countries will best achieve higher living 
standards for New Zealanders? 
 
The concept of living standards is rich and complex, making it difficult to define 
or pin down.  It is likely to mean different things to different people, and to 
change over time, making the idea of aggregation into a concept of ‘New 
Zealanders’ living standards’ particularly problematic.  ‘Living standards’, or 
well-being, encompasses many elements, both tangible and intangible.  It is 
likely to include physical elements (eg health and security), material elements 
(eg employment and income), social elements (eg personal relationships, a 
welfare system), political elements (eg freedom of choice and action), 
environmental elements (eg clean air, leisure time) and elements that bring a 
sense of meaning (eg religious beliefs, cultural or national identity).  This list is 
by no means exhaustive!  Many of these components of living standards can be 
affected by government policies; some cannot. 
 
In this discussion we have chosen to focus on four elements from among the 
large bundle of qualities that comprise living standards: incomes, income 
distribution, decision making power – particularly at the nation state level, and 
identity. 
 






















Higher Living Standards for New Zealanders 







Cross border flows of goods, services, capital 
and people  
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Whatever view one takes about living standards, income is important.  A large 
proportion of what matters to individuals and families has to be paid for.   
Income brings choices; it allows greater levels of consumption, more leisure, 
greater capacity for individuals to help those less fortunate than themselves, and 
greater means for the economy as a whole to provide education, health and other 
social services.  The key to higher incomes is productivity.  Higher productivity 
means that more goods and services can be produced for the same amount of 
resources and effort.  Whatever mix of outcomes New Zealanders choose, long-
term growth in production and incomes is the foundation upon which higher 
living standards are built.   
 
Economic theory has taught us that integration and openness are likely to have 
positive effects on productivity and growth.  Section 4 below reviews the evidence 
on the links between cross border flows of goods, services, capital and labour, 
and productivity. 
 
Other, broader, aspects of living standards, however, often fuel concerns about 
trade, integration and globalisation.  Some argue that openness has contributed 
to growing income disparities.  Many are worried that globalisation has 
compromised, and will continue to compromise, our control over our lives and 
erode both our personal and national sovereignty.  This fear is linked to a vaguely 
defined, but deeply felt, concern about who we are as New Zealanders. 
 
In Section 5 to 7 we discuss the effects of integration on income distribution, 
decision-making/sovereignty and identity.  These three issues have been 
selected because they seem to be particularly high profile concerns associated 
with integration and globalisation.
2  S o ver ei g nty a n d ide nt ity i n p a r ticu lar  ar e 
new areas for us: the paper offers some initial thinking and ideas on these 
topics, but we are by no means experts! 
 
3.2 A  new  perspective 
In our analysis we employ two conceptual windows. 
 
View One: New Zealand as a Nation State 
We can think of the world as comprising sovereign nations with borders that 
clearly differentiate each from the rest of the world.  Traditional trade literature 
puts the focus on New Zealand as a nation, experiencing flows across its borders 
but not experiencing any effects from the particular spatial patterns of the flows.  
Traditional political thinking takes the nation state as its base unit of analysis 
and concerns itself with what the appropriate role and powers of this state 
should be. 
 
                                            
2   Concern about globalisation is also associated with environmental issues.  
Choosing to discuss decision-making and identity rather than environmental 
issues in this paper reflects our view that these issues have been less well 
canvassed elsewhere.   
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View Two: New Zealand as a Region 
Alternatively we can think of the world as a series of concentric groupings.  At 
the most basic level is the individual, or the family.  Beyond that there are local 
groupings at various levels, such as community, city or region.  Nations with a 
federal system include government at province or state level.  Beyond state 
government is national (or federal, or central) government.  Beyond nation states 
there are international groupings, bilateral and regional.  Finally, at the widest 
level, there are international groupings including all of humanity.  New Zealand 
the nation state is but one level of social organization – we are a region within 
larger regions, and we contain smaller regions within our borders.  View Two 
takes the focus off the nation state and views New Zealand as a sub-region within 
larger, and smaller, areas. 
 



























More recent literature in economic geography takes this view.  It puts the focus 
on New Zealand as a region of a larger space, say, the Australasian region or the 
Asia-Pacific, or the world.  This reveals the implications of spatial location for 
cross border flows to a much greater degree and provides a different view of the 
effects of openness and integration.  If we apply this perspective to issues of 
political governance we also gain new insights.  Questions about the role of the 
state broaden to include questions about the level of governance at which 
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View One is the more traditional way of looking at the world.  We are accustomed 
to thinking of our planet in terms of political, nation state shaped, chunks.  This 
is to be expected; over the last 200 years, nation states have been the dominant 
political unit of social organisation.   
 
However, it is important to keep in mind that nation states are a modern 
phenomenon.   Prior to the nineteenth century, social organisation was based on 
agrarian social structures that were both smaller than nation state units (city 
states, feudal principalities) and larger (empires, both secular and religious).   
What View Two helps us keep in mind, is that nation states are not ‘naturally’ 
privileged.  They are one level of social organization – a particularly important 
one in the modern world – but there are others.  Furthermore, in an increasingly 
global world, nation states may be losing their primacy.  There has been a trend 
in recent years toward both devolution to lower levels of government and 
cooperation with higher levels.  What these developments have in common is a 
de-emphasising of the nation state.
3 
 
Looking at issues of integration from the perspective of View Two sheds a 
different light on many of the issues.  In particular, there are implications for the 
location of economic activity, governance and identity.  Let’s keep these two 
conceptual windows in mind as we proceed with the analysis. 
 
 
                                            
3   There may be debate about the degree to which nation states are actually losing 
their primacy.  This is a matter for historians and political analysts and, in any 
case, is secondary to this discussion, since what is being advanced is an analytic 
tool rather than a statement of empirical fact.  
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4.   Integration, Incomes and Productivity 
As discussed in Section 3, living standards have many elements, tangible and 
intangible.  This section focuses on two tangible elements of living standards – 
higher incomes and employment opportunities – and the role openness and 
integration play in relation to these elements.  It also looks at the ability to 
purchase a greater variety of goods and services, though in less depth.   
 
This section is structured as follows. 
 
•  To set the scene, section 4.1 briefly looks at the link between productivity 
and higher living standards and argues that productivity is the key to 
higher incomes. 
•  Section 4.2 discusses what general effects might improve productivity, 
introduces some spatial economic ideas and weighs up the importance of 
domestic policy versus openness in achieving productivity improvements. 
•  Section 4.3 looks at whether cross border flows of goods and factors can 
lead to these productivity-improving effects.  The discussion is split in 
two: first we look at New Zealand as a nation, secondly at New Zealand as 
a region.   
•  Section 4.4 surveys some recent empirical literature on the relationship 
between openness and growth.   
•  Section 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.1  Productivity and living standards 
Higher incomes are an important component of rising living standards.  They 
allow: 
 
•  greater levels of consumption for individuals; 
•  more leisure, for example taking more holidays or working fewer hours;  
•  greater capacity for individuals to help those less fortunate than 
themselves, through donations of either time or money; and 
•  greater means for the economy as a whole to provide education, health 
and other social services, as well as support for cultural activities
4. 
 
The key to higher incomes is productivity.  Productivity is a measure of the rate 
at which outputs of goods and services are produced from given amounts of 
inputs.  Higher productivity means that more goods and services can be 
produced from the same amount of resources and effort.  As output increases so 
too do incomes, as more wages are paid and profits rise. 
 
Using more inputs can also increase output.  However, this implies a cost – that 
of using the input.  It is also possible that increasing inputs may raise overall 
activity but not increase per capita incomes
5.  Galt (2000) says that productivity 
is particularly relevant as a contributor to raising GDP per capita or other welfare 
                                            
4   Industry Commission (1997), pg 79 
5   For a discussion of growth and the contribution of increased inputs see Appendix 
1.  
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related measures of performance, as it does not necessarily require additional 
inputs to achieve gains.  He notes that total factor productivity (TFP) has 
historically been the single largest contributor to GDP growth in New Zealand
6.  
For Australia, productivity growth has accounted for around half the growth in 
output between 1964-65 and 1995-96
7.  It has also accounted for around two-
thirds of the increase in Australian living standards over the same period.   
 
Productivity also affects employment.  In general, productivity growth over the 
long term creates the opportunity for new demands to be created and realised, 
leading to changes in the pattern of employment, but not necessarily long-term 
reductions in employment.  For OECD countries as a whole, since the early 
1970s declining rates of productivity growth have coincided with increasing rates 
of unemployment, and the period of highest productivity for most OECD 
countries coincided with the period of lowest unemployment
8.  It appears that 
there is a positive relationship between productivity and employment. 
 
4.2 What  improves  productivity? 
What are the linkages between openness, integration and productivity?  Figure 3 
lays out the framework we have chosen to use in this section – it shows how 
cross border flows affect productivity and ultimately the goal of higher living 
standards for New Zealanders. 
 
                                            
6   For a discussion of productivity performance in New Zealand see Diewert and 
Lawrence (1999) 
7   Industry Commission (1997), chapter 3. 
8   Industry Commission (1997) pg 104  
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Figure 3: Linkages between higher living standards and cross border flows of goods, 




Cross-border flows of goods, services,  
 
labour and capital 
Adapted from Productivity Commission 1999, pg 155. 
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Cross border flows are defined as those flows of goods, services, labour and 
capital that move across New Zealand’s internationally recognised boundary.   
These cross border flows set off various reactions in the economy.  We are 
interested in knowing whether these reactions are productivity-improving effects.  
As discussed in section 4.1, if there are productivity improvements then it is 
possible to raise living standards.  Affecting this is the policy environment 
relating to cross border flows – policies will alter the effects of cross border flows 
and hence affect productivity. 
 
There are a number of ways that one can classify the various mechanisms for 
improving productivity.  We chose to consider them under the following 
headings: resource allocation; scale, scope and specialisation; technological 
advance; firm organisation, management practices and work arrangements; and 
plant/firm turnover within industries, as outlined in Figure 3.  However, in using 
these headings, we should not lose sight of the fact that all of these ways of 
improving productivity share a fundamental common component:  the 
importance of high quality decision-making by the firms, individuals and 
institutions involved.  Ultimately, improved productivity stems from better 
decisions about the use of valuable assets. 
 
Of course, Figure 3 is simplified.  We have chosen to focus on the productivity 
linkages as this provides a dynamic analysis.  It is likely that the dynamic story 
surrounding cross border flows may be more interesting than the static story, 
with the dynamic benefits of cross border flows outweighing the static benefits 
due to their ongoing nature.  There are other aspects that could be included in 
Figure 3, for example, the presence of welfare effects.  Trade in goods and 
services allows consumers to enlarge their consumption possibilities, thus 
improving living standards.  This is an important benefit of openness beyond 
productivity improvements and is mentioned briefly later in the chapter.   
However, given the static nature of the benefits we chose not to make it a central 
element of our framework.   
 
The central question is how is productivity affected by openness and integration 
in the goods, services, capital and labour markets?  We approach the answer in 
two stages.  First, in this section, we take a closer look at the ‘economic effects’ 
box in Figure 3 – how do we get productivity improvements?  Secondly, in section 
4.3, we look at how cross border flows affect productivity via our ‘economic 
effects’.  Through both of these stages we attempt to distil some key messages.  
The impact of policy on cross border flows will be addressed briefly in Section 9 
later in the paper – this is certainly an area for further reflection and work.   
 
It is important to note that a country’s level of integration is only one factor 
affecting productivity.  Domestic policy is also important.  At the end of this 
section we attempt to weigh up the relative value of openness against the value 
of domestic policy, in order to provide a balanced view of the merits of openness. 
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4.2.1 Resource  allocation 
The importance of allocating resources well for ensuring high levels of 
productivity is intuitively obvious.  Essentially, it can be summed up in the 
statement that "you've got to make the most of what you've got". 
 
Economists have a number of concepts for thinking about resource allocation.  
The first is simply that resources should not be used wastefully; that one should 
use the minimum amount of resources to produce a given output, in accordance 
with technology.  This is referred to as technical or productive efficiency.  The 
second is that resources should be used in the areas where they can be of most 
value, given the skills and preferences of the population.  This is known as 
allocative efficiency.  Note that this idea of allocative efficiency is pertinent both 
within firms (eg are our productive processes geared in the right way?) and 
between firms (eg are resources flowing to the right parts of the economy?).  
 
The third concept is that, as time passes, external factors change, for example 
other countries become more competitive or relative prices for exports change. 
The economy should be flexible enough to allow changes in resource allocation 
(structural change) at low cost.  This is known as dynamic efficiency.  
 
Improvements in all these types of efficiency can lift the productivity 
performance of a country.  While the importance of good resource allocation may 
seem obvious, it is important not to underestimate its value.  Getting resource 
allocation right over the long-term is crucial to ensuring maximum growth, 
incomes and employment. 
 
4.2.2  Scale, scope and specialisation 
Scale, scope and specialisation offer significant abilities for individuals and 
firms, and therefore nations, to improve productivity. 
 
Specialisation is probably the most fundamental.  The concept holds at the level 
of the individual, firm and country.  For an individual or firm, specialisation 
suggests focusing on performing a specific task, becoming expert in a particular 
field, or producing just a few products or services.  This allows the individual or 
firm to become skilled at their chosen task and more productive at carrying it 
out, particularly as they learn better ways to operate.   
 
For a country, specialisation suggests producing a limited number of products or 
services but producing more than is required to satisfy domestic demand, and 
then trading this surplus for other things not produced domestically.  The payoff 
of this ability to specialise is particularly important for such a small nation as 
New Zealand.  By way of illustration, when New Zealand continued to assemble 
(not actually make) cars in the mid 1990s, it was calculated that car buyers had 
to pay many thousands of dollars in tariff revenue per car over and above the 
price other countries could produce and ship the car for.  Specialisation at the 
country level has traditionally been thought of as being driven by comparative 
advantage, that is, focussing on what we are good at making and importing what 
we are less good at.  However, the rapid growth of intra-firm trade and the  
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observable patterns of countries selling similar products to each other have led 
to other models of the drivers of specialisation and trade being considered 
important.  
 
Scale is also an important contributor to productivity.  Economies of scale exist 
when the expansion of activity within a firm allows it to enjoy reduced average 
costs of production.  Higher productivity results as fewer inputs are used per unit 
of output.  The level of output where this effect stops will vary from industry to 
industry, however, there is no doubt, for example, that the New Zealand dairy 
industry would not be able to produce milk and dairy products as cheaply as it 
does if it only produced, say one-tenth, of the current amount.  Economies of 
scale can also encourage further specialisation, unleashing another round of 
productivity-improving forces. 
 
Finally, scope can have a positive effect on productivity.  Economies of scope 
exist when a firm’s cost of producing a unit of output can be reduced due to the 
range of activities carried out by that firm, or other firms in the region.  Such 
effects are the key drivers behind the clustering of firms in a region.   
 
4.2.3 Technological  advance 
Technological advance is widely recognised as being a central driver of 
productivity improvements and economic growth.  It encompasses the ideas of 
invention, innovation and diffusion.  By definition it helps to improve 
productivity, as technological advance improves processes for making existing 
goods and services and creates new goods and services that better satisfy 
consumers.  This improves the efficiency of resource use and helps to make 
more from resources over time.   
 
Technological advance comes through many avenues.  Science based innovation 
can be very risky and may account for only about 20% of all technical progress
9.  
Non-science innovation generally happens within firms and is less risky than 
science generated innovation.   
 
4.2.4  Accumulation of human capital 
The accumulation of human capital is vital for increasing productivity.  It is not 
enough simply to have more workers – those workers also need to be highly 
skilled and better educated
10.  More educated workers are better at making, 
using and improving new knowledge, which stimulates technological advance 
and thus productivity.  They are also better at adapting foreign technologies to 
local conditions – an important factor for a small country such as New Zealand.  
Skilled workers tend to be more flexible to changes in tasks and processes. 
 
More skilled people also tend to be more discerning consumers.  This is also 
beneficial to productivity as it puts additional pressure on producers to make 
                                            
9   Salter & Martin (1999) 
10   See Appendix 1 for a discussion of input accumulation and growth.  
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quality products, use resources efficiently, and come up with innovative new 
ideas. 
 
4.2.5  Accumulation of physical capital 
As discussed in Appendix 1, higher inputs of capital can contribute to economic 
growth by increasing productive capacity.  However, higher levels of capital can 
also directly help to improve productivity.  Firstly, labour productivity is 
increased as workers each have more capital to work with.  This is known as 
capital deepening.  Secondly, investment in capital equipment may create 
knowledge spillovers as skilled workers seek to understand and improve on 
technologies embodied in capital equipment
11.  This ‘spillover’ effect can help to 
increase total factor productivity (TFP). 
 
4.2.6  Firm organisation, management practices and work arrangements 
The way in which New Zealand firms are organised and managed will affect their 
profitability, and ultimately the nation's productivity.  There is a great deal of 
evidence internationally that attests to the importance of firm organisation, 
management practices and work arrangements.  Firm organisation refers to 
organisational structure – a good structure will allow and encourage flexibility 
and cross-fertilisation of ideas so as to enhance innovation and creativity.   
Management practices refer to such things as Total Quality Management, 
strategic planning and human resource management.  Practices should support 
long-term planning and innovation and the ongoing improvement of processes 
and workers.  Finally, work arrangements refer mainly to industrial relations.   
Workplace and individual bargaining give more scope for flexibility, enables firms 
to better reward productivity improvements and allows the scope to introduce 
bonuses and other performance related measures. 
 
In New Zealand, studies suggest that management practices and work 
arrangements have steadily improved over the last decade, but still fall some 
way behind international best practice
12. 
 
4.2.7 Plant/firm  turnover 
Many of the firms that now dominate certain sectors of the economy did not exist 
20 years ago, particularly in the "new" technology sectors.  It is relatively widely 
agreed that new firms are the key providers of innovation, and hence that a 
healthy supply of new firms is essential for a flourishing economy
13.  The flipside 
is that older, less productive firms need to be able to decline so that resources 
are released to new firms. 
 
                                            
11   Productivity Commission (1999) pg 151 
12   Healy (1999).  Also see, for example, Campbell-Hunt, Harper & Hamilton (1993) 
“Islands of Excellence? A study of management in New Zealand.”  Also, Campbell-
Hunt & Corbett (1996) “A season of excellence?” An overview of New Zealand 
enterprise in the nineties.” 
13   Levehsohn & Petrin (1999)  
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The process through which new firms arrive is important.  Statistics suggest that 
far more firm start-ups occur in any one year than the economy could ultimately 
sustain
14.  New start-ups literally have to compete to survive against each other 
as well as the incumbents.  This process naturally advantages those with new 
skills, ideas or technologies that will make them more competitive.  This process 
is nicely captured in the Schumpeterean concept of "creative destruction" where 
the failure of old firms can be a positive for the economy as a whole. 
 
4.2.8  The spatial element to productivity 
There is a spatial element to several of the ‘productivity improving effects’ that 
we have described so far.  By this we mean that where something takes place is 
very important – activity does not exist in a vacuum and the actual layout of 
activity across space can noticeably affect productivity. 
 
The key issue is resource allocation across space.  Agglomeration of resources 
and production in a particular location can improve productivity, as greater 
density leads to lower transport costs, greater specialisation of production and 
labour, labour market pooling effects and knowledge spillovers
15.   
 
Lower transport costs arise due to the smaller distances to suppliers and final 
consumers.  Agglomerations are also often the hubs of transport networks, again 
making transportation cheaper and easier and lowering overall costs for 
businesses.   
 
A higher degree of specialisation can be achieved in denser areas by both firms 
and workers due to the larger market.  As scale increases, firms and workers 
become more efficient at producing or delivering their particular good, service or 
skill, and productivity can rise.  Specialisation also leads to greater variety and 
diversity of products and services within the agglomeration, benefiting both 
producers and consumers.  Low transport costs help to encourage specialisation 
as it becomes possible to serve a larger market more cheaply.   
 
The thick labour market in an agglomeration enables workers to be ‘insured’ 
against firm or industry specific shocks, to better match their skills with jobs, 
and to have more bargaining power with employers.  One US study suggested 
that doubling employment density in a particular location might increase that 
location’s labour productivity by 6% and TFP by 4%
16.   
 
Knowledge spillovers are greater in dense areas as the easy movement of 
workers between proximate firms and the formal and informal contact between 
people allows ideas and expertise to disperse.  Such dispersion of ideas 
encourages and enables the creation of new ideas, new processes and new 
products – in other words, encouraging the innovation process.  The unplanned 
idea combinations that are facilitated by proximity are vital for innovation and 
growth.  Knowledge spillovers and greater interaction also spur faster human 
                                            
14   Pinfold (1999) 
15   See Box (2000) for more detail on this section 
16   Ciccone & Hall (1996)  
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capital accumulation.  This is supported by evidence from the US showing 
nominal wages to be 20% higher in urban areas, even after accounting for 
differences in worker experience, education, ethnicity and ability
17. 
 
4.2.9  Domestic policy vs openness in achieving productivity improvements 
There is an important question to be answered now: is openness of overriding 
importance to achieving productivity improvements or can domestic policy do 
the same job?  In other words, how important is it for New Zealand to be open 
and integrated with the rest of the world if we wish to achieve our goal of higher 
living standards? 
 
For a small economy such as New Zealand, trade may assume greater 
significance than it would for a larger economy.  Small countries face tighter 
resource and market size constraints and openness may provide valuable access 
to the means needed for growth.  Openness can help to: 
 
•  ensure relative prices are undistorted, leading to better resource 
allocation; 
•  reduce monopolistic behaviour in the marketplace by allowing new 
competition;  
•  give greater opportunities to achieve economies of scale and improve 
signals for choosing areas of specialisation; 
•  enable the transfer of technology from other countries to take place; 
•  provide additional sources of capital; 
•  introduce quality management practices from overseas; and 
•  stimulate innovation by widening the scope for applying and selling new 
products and processes.   
 
Openness and domestic policy are also not unrelated.  Closed economies are 
insulated from pressures to reform and low quality policy settings may be able to 
persist.  Openness can help to stimulate reform and push for higher quality 
policy.  For example, inefficient regulatory systems will hamper domestic 
producers.  An open market will see these producers lose market share unless 
domestic regulations are improved.  Another example is provided by the recent 
Asian crisis, where countries with weak institutional structures felt the full force 
of disapproving capital markets. 
 
Empirically, small countries do trade more than large countries, as reflected by 
trade as a percentage of GDP
18.  This supports the idea that openness is more 
important to small countries.  New Zealand is currently behind many small 
countries in its trade openness, suggesting there may be further scope for gains 
from openness. 
 
However, once a country has moved from a ‘fortress economy’ to reasonably low 
levels of protection, the marginal gains from further integration are not clear.  
The idea of diminishing returns to openness is raised in Helliwell (1998).   
                                            
17   Audretsch (1998), Glaeser & Maré (1999 forthcoming) 
18   See Plater & Claridge (2000)  
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Helliwell suggests that there may come a point where a reduction in border 
effects yields few additional gains from trade.  He says that if there is a critical 
degree of openness necessary to receive knowledge transfers of the sort required 
to achieve convergence to higher growth and productivity, then further 
integration beyond that may not be important for growth.  There may be 
decreasing returns to additional trade and investment, and continuing home 
preferences may simply reflect an equilibrium where the lower costs of operating 
with known norms and institutions are enough to offset any growth gains from 
further increases in the density of international linkages.  Helliwell says that for 
the industrial countries already tightly bound into the global trading system, 
there are likely to be fewer gains from further globalisation, and that border 
effects may remain at levels similar to those among the OECD currently without 
causing any material loss of welfare.   
 
It is unclear what the optimal degree of openness is for New Zealand, or whether 
we could ever develop an appropriately sophisticated framework for analysis, but 
the next section will make a start by setting out the effects of free flows of 
products and factors.  We believe this is an important area for further thinking. 
 
Summary: What Improves Productivity? 
The economics literature identifies seven major determinants of productivity: 
resource allocation; scale, scope and specialisation; technological advance; 
accumulation of human capital; accumulation of physical capital; firm 
organisation, management practises and work arrangements; and plant/firm 
turnover.  The common component of these determinants is the importance of 
quality decision-making by individuals, firms and institutions. 
 
The layout of activity across space can noticeably affect productivity.   
Agglomeration of resources and production in a particular location can improve 
productivity, as greater density leads to lower transport costs, greater 
specialisation of production and labour, labour market pooling effects and 
knowledge spillovers. 
 
Both domestic policy and openness contribute to raising productivity.  But for a 
small country, openness assumes greater importance than it would for a large 
country because of tighter resource and market size constraints.  Openness can 
also support and encourage domestic policy reform. 
 
There may be diminishing returns to openness but it is unclear where exactly 
these would set in.  The next section helps to inform the debate by discussing 
the effects of cross border flows of products and factors. 
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4.3  What effects do cross border flows have? 
As discussed earlier, when we talk about cross border flows we mean flows of 
goods, services, capital and labour across internationally recognised national 
boundaries.  Nations are considered economic units and are analysed as such.  
This is how traditional trade theories have generally been interpreted. 
 
However, political units and economic units do not necessarily share the same 
boundaries.  Nations become economic units via barriers to trade – explicit tariff-
type barriers, red tape and regulations, limited mobility of people, different 
tastes and diverse cultures.  With countries increasingly choosing to integrate 
with their neighbours or trading partners, the distinction between international 
trade and interregional trade is blurring.  Countries begin to look more like 
regions, with high levels of trade, specialisation and factor flows. 
 
This section looks at the implications of openness and integration for New 
Zealand’s productivity.  We use two conceptual windows to do this – New 
Zealand as both a nation and as a region of a larger economic area.  This gives 
us new insights and shows that the case for increased integration is not as clear-
cut as might be thought.  Within each ‘window’ we take an incremental approach 
to the analysis – commencing from a completely closed economy, we first 
examine a world where only goods and services move, then expand the story to 
include capital and finally labour movements. 
 
4.3.1  New Zealand as a nation 
Goods and services 
We start the analysis by assuming a world where factors of production remain 
immobile between countries.  Both inward and outward flows of goods and 
services are free. 
 
Looking first at goods trade, at the simplest level, when goods trade between 
countries is freed up, the impetus for actual trade between countries is based on 
having different labour productivities
19 or different resource bases
20.  This 
introduces the idea that one country can produce some good(s) relatively more 
cheaply than another country, that is, each country has a comparative advantage 
in the production of something.  When trade begins, each country will reallocate 
resources to, and specialise in, its area of comparative advantage – resources 
are therefore moved to the area where they have the highest productivity within 
each country.  Each country will then export its surplus production, with 
resulting gains from trade of enlarged consumption possibilities and cheaper 
access to goods.  With transport costs there may also be some non-traded 
goods.   
 
This simple story about goods trade leads to some important income 
distribution implications.  These will be discussed in more depth in Section 5, 
                                            
19   Ricardian model (see Caves, Frankel & Jones (1993) Chapter 5) 
20   Heckscher-Ohlin model (see Caves, Frankel & Jones (1993) Chapter 7)  
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but briefly, labour and capital that is specific to the production of the export 
good, or that is used intensively in the production of the export good will tend to 
benefit.  Factors specific to, or used intensively in, the import-competing sectors 
tend to lose.  However, if ‘loser’ factors can shift their specificity (for example, 
retrain) there will be scope for them to benefit from trade.  There is also scope 
for redistribution of the gains from trade.   
 
When we incorporate second-round gains from changing resource allocation and 
specialisation a more dynamic story emerges.  The first situation is where firms 
have internal economies of scale.  There is an immediate productivity gain from 
trade and specialisation as the larger market allows a bigger scale of production 
and leads to a falling cost per unit.  There will also be more variety for 
consumers as the number of firms and types of good increase with trade
21.  
Individual countries can be constrained by the size of their domestic market in 
industries with economies of scale – trade overcomes this and offers 
opportunities for mutual gain even if countries do not differ in their resources or 
technology.  There can also be productivity benefits from increased competition 
in the marketplace – firms will have greater impetus to make good decisions 
about their resources, to keep up with technological advances and innovations, 
and to keep their workplaces flexible and responsive to change
22.   
 
The pattern of trade becomes less predictable in this type of world – while 
comparative advantage will drive inter-industry trade, for example trading cars 
for butter, it does not fully explain intra-industry trade, where different varieties 
of the same good are traded.  One country will be a net exporter of the 
differentiated product and this will reflect their underlying comparative 
advantage, but it is unclear which country will export which variety of the good – 
history and accident will play a part.  The relative importance of inter- and intra-
industry trade depends on how similar countries are – more similar countries, in 
terms of capital/labour ratios, skill levels and incomes, have higher proportions 
of intra-industry trade.  Intra-industry trade makes up a large part of world trade, 
especially in manufacturing trade between advanced industrial countries, and 
gives great scope for welfare gains in terms of variety and productivity gains. 
 
When intra-industry trade dominates, the income distribution effects are small.  
This is because intra-industry trade does not lead to large changes in relative 
prices between industries.  Rather it stimulates resource allocation within an 
industry, between different varieties of a particular item.  Intra-industry trade 
does not tend to lead to whole industries declining.  An example is provided by 
the European Union – trade grew rapidly in the first few years of integration but 
this did not cause drastic economic dislocation.  The reason was that much of 
the increase was in intra-industry trade where each country was gaining from the 
increased efficiency of a larger market
23. 
 
The second ‘dynamic’ situation is where there are external economies of scale: 
here the gains from trade stem from scale economies from increased output at 
                                            
21   Krugman & Obstfeld (1994) 
22   See for example Brander & Krugman (1983) 
23   See Krugman & Obstfeld (1993) pg 132  
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the industry level.  As before, the increased scale leads to greater specialisation 
and productivity gains.  However, history and path dependence play a role in the 
case of external economies of scale.  A country that has a high level of 
production in a certain industry, for whatever reason, will tend to have lower 
costs in that industry.  Since a country that has lower costs in the production of 
a good tends to produce more and export that good, this leads to a positive 
feedback loop.  Countries that start out as large producers may remain large 
producers, even if some other country could potentially produce the goods more 
cheaply.  This gives a role to historical accident and raises the possibility that a 
country may be left worse off as a result of trade if it could produce the good 
more cheaply than its trading partner but is unable to break into the established 
market due to its later start.  This is also true in cases where external economies 
are based on the accumulation of knowledge or experience
24.  Both these cases 
are commonly used as arguments for industry protection (see boxed discussion 
below). 
 
However, path dependence may be overcome – tastes and technology change 
and new opportunities can present themselves most unexpectedly.  Perhaps the 
l e s s o n  i s  t h a t  h i s t o r y  m a t t e r s ,  b u t  y o u  n e v e r  k n o w  w h a t  i s  a r o u n d  t h e  n e x t  
corner. 
                                            
24   ibid pg 142, also Krugman (1991).  
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Industry Policy – A Discussion 
Theory suggests that, under certain circumstances, government support of a 
domestic industry against foreign competition can reap net benefits for the 
country.  The benefits stem from the increased scale and market share of the 
industry. 
 
There are several considerations that undermine this direction for government 
policy
25.  Firstly, the policy recommendations are sensitive to the industry’s 
market structure – competition based on price suggests a tax on the home firm, 
whereas competition based on output suggests a subsidy.  Government would 
have to hold extremely accurate information about firm behaviour in order to 
determine the policy intervention.  Secondly, government subsidies can induce 
excessive entry into the industry, leading to resource misallocation and failure to 
achieve economies of scale at the firm level.  Thirdly, there is a risk of foreign 
retaliation.  Fourthly, there is a risk that special interest groups, whose lobbying 
can compromise the effectiveness of policy and whose ‘noise’ makes it difficult 
to collect accurate data and information, will capture policy.  Finally there is the 
fiscal cost of paying for industrial support.   
 
At a practical level, there are difficulties in selecting the right industry to 
support.  There are also costs if chosen industries fail to reach independence, or 
if supported industries fail to advance.  In short, the theoretical ideas about 
economies of scale and trade do not lend themselves to clear and simple policy 
implications when we look through the traditional ‘New Zealand as a nation’ lens. 
 
Nonetheless, many countries choose to undertake industry policy.  Some have 
had more success than others.  The interesting point to note is that many 
developing countries choose to use trade policy as their industry policy lever to 
encourage manufacturing over agriculture in order to ‘catch-up’ to developed 
countries. 
 
Some countries use tariffs and other protective policies to encourage the 
replacement of imported manufactures by domestic products.  These policies 
have been successful in encouraging manufacturing in some countries but in 
others there has been stagnation in per capita income growth and lack of catch-
up to advanced countries.  The policies can also give rise to a dual economy 
where one section of the economy and population is doing well while the other 
struggles.  The policies can lead to a widening distribution of incomes.  Often the 
export sector suffers.  Other countries follow a more export-oriented policy.  This 
is not strictly free trade, but rates of protection are lower and less variable 
across sectors.  Countries that fall into this category would include Korea, 
Taiwan and Singapore.  All these countries have had quite successful economic 
growth stories. 
 
In general though, using trade policy tools for industry policy purposes is costly.  
There are other policies that aim more directly at industry policy goals and these 
will be more efficient and effective.  It may be that for a developing country, the 
tax base is too unstable to sustain subsidies to industry, and so trade policy is 
used instead.  But for a developed country, direct tools should be used.  Industry 
policy and trade policy should not be confused. 
 
Should industry policy be used at all?  From these arguments, the answer seems 
to be ‘no’.  But when we look through our ‘New Zealand as a region’ lens?  Read 
on… 
                                            
25   See Cheng (1999)  
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Analytically the story about services trade is similar to that for goods trade.   
There are gains from specialisation, the reallocation of resources, economies of 
scale and innovativeness stemming from competitive pressures.  Competition in 
the service sector can also reduce costs for other businesses that use services as 
an intermediate input into their own production.   
 
However, the movement of services across borders additionally implies the 
movement of people and/or extensive use of telecommunications networks.  The 
movement of people would usually be only temporary, for example, an 
engineering consultant from New Zealand going to Asia for a few months, or an 
American tourist coming to New Zealand for a holiday.  Temporary foreign 
workers can be an important source of new ideas and New Zealanders who work 
temporarily overseas can also pick up new ideas and contacts that can later 
benefit activity in New Zealand.  The movement of labour will be discussed in 





Unilateral Liberalisation – What are the Gains? 
The discussion in this section has implicitly assumed that New Zealand is 
liberalising goods and services trade in concert with its trading partners.  
But unilateral liberalisation can also allow us to tap into some of the gains 
from trade, even if our partners keep their barriers up.   
 
New Zealand’s high rate of protection in the 1960s and 1970s led many 
commentators to call for liberalisation.  Carpinter (1979) concluded that 
the method of protection in New Zealand, specifically quantitative import 
controls, was detrimental to economic performance.  Local price signals 
were distorted and international competition stifled, leading to 
unprofitable enterprise, distorted investment, stunted exports, inefficient 
use of resources, poor productivity growth and continued Balance of 
Payments problems.   
 
Lloyd et al (1980) agreed, saying that major structural change was a 
necessary condition for acceleration in the rate of growth of real output.  
Government assistance to industries in the form of restrictions on import 
and export trade distorted the allocation of resources between and within 
the export and import-competing and non-tradeable sector.  This reduced 
the level of international trade and the size of the tradeable sector and 
slowed the rate of growth of productivity by restricting competition and 
hindering adaptation to structural change.  Lloyd saw the removal of this 
government assistance as important in promoting structural change and 
economic growth.   
 
Unilaterally removing layers of protection allowed New Zealand to access 
the benefits of openness.  It also paved the way for more far-reaching 
liberalisation, for example, CER with Australia.  
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Capital 
Once we allow factors of production to move the analysis becomes more 
complex.  In this section we look at the impact of allowing free movement of 
capital across borders.  This includes movement of both direct investment funds 
and portfolio investment funds.   
 
There are a number of general benefits of allowing free capital flows
26.  To begin 
with the domestic cost of capital moves closer to the global cost of capital.  The 
true value of an investment opportunity will be judged more accurately and 
resources will therefore be better allocated.  Also contributing to better resource 
allocation is greater transparency, which reduces favouritism and corruption in 
the system; fewer resources are wasted on attempting to dodge controls through 
bribery for example.  Secondly, countries may be able to borrow and lend on 
more favourable terms.  This flows through into lower costs for firms sourcing 
capital.  This gain stems from breaking the constraining link between domestic 
saving and investment as countries and firms can draw on foreign savings to 
finance domestic investment.  However, pushing against this, there is evidence 
that home bias in portfolio investment remains, even with free capital flows, due 
to the perceived advantages of dealing with the ‘familiar’ outweighing the 
perceived benefits of diversification
27.  Allowing firms and countries to access 
foreign savings also raises issues around the level of the current account – a 
large appetite for foreign borrowing may increase the current account deficit to 
such a level as to increase the cost of borrowing for the country as a whole. 
 
Another general benefit of open capital markets is the greater level of portfolio 
diversification available.  This can reduce the volatility of investment returns and 
even increase actual returns if higher returns may be gained on foreign asset 
holdings.  Open capital markets also encourage innovation and efficiency in 
domestic financial markets, as well as supervision and good regulation of the 
financial sector.  Finally, the multilateral trading system is supported by free 
capital flows, since payments for goods and services can be made freely, and 
more sophisticated financial arrangements (e.g. futures) can be entered into, 
which stimulates further trade. 
 
There is some debate over whether capital flows are a substitute for trade.   
Trade theory tells us that movements of factors of production can alter 
production in such a way as to remove the need for trade in goods and services.  
However, given the simultaneous rise in both levels of trade and levels of capital 
flows over history, one could suggest that capital flows are a complement to 
trade, hence the idea that capital flows support the trading system. 
 
There are some particular benefits to be gained from allowing free movement of 
direct investment funds.  Inward direct investment often brings with it new 
technology and ideas, management competency and formal training of the 
workforce.  It can also lead to greater competition in the marketplace.  These 
factors all contribute to productivity improvements.  The benefits can also 
                                            
26   Box (1999a), Chapman (2000) 
27   Helliwell (1998) pg 69-72  
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spillover to domestic firms as people move and ideas disperse, initiating further 
productivity improvements.  A good example of the benefits of inward direct 
investment is provided by Ireland – foreign firms in Ireland employ highly skilled 
people and tend to pay significantly higher wages than domestic firms
28.   
 
Outward direct investment brings benefits as well.  Most importantly, New 
Zealand firms offshore may transfer new technology or knowledge back to New 
Zealand.  Being located in an offshore market not only offers opportunities to 
pick up new ideas, it may also provide greater impetus to innovate if the market 
is large, as the potential to appropriate the gains is bigger.  Secondly, offshore 
firms may provide domestic firms with access to networks of suppliers, 
distributors, researchers and other important contacts that provide valuable 
externalities that are inaccessible from a New Zealand base.  Thirdly, it may be 
easier to access offshore markets via direct investment in the market, and it may 
also get around domestic production and marketing constraints and allow 
greater economies of scale.  Finally, investing offshore may allow New Zealand 
firms to experiment with new techniques for management and with new 
organisational options, which can then be brought back to New Zealand and 
operationalised.   
 
However, there are concerns over both inward and outward foreign direct 
investment.  Inward foreign investment raises issues such as the ownership of 
assets and sovereignty, while outward investment raises issues such as the loss 
of domestic jobs.  The first two concerns will be explored in more depth in 
Section 6.  The loss of domestic activity will be discussed later in this section in 
the context of ‘New Zealand as a region’. 
 
There are also potential costs of having open capital markets
29.  These costs 
have taken on greater visibility of late with the financial crisis in Asia and earlier 
difficulties in Latin America.  To begin with, capital flows may harm domestic 
economic activity.  There are a number of reasons why this might occur.  Firstly, 
capital flows cause adjustments in the real economy, that is, production and 
employment.  As the real economy responds to change more slowly than 
financial capital there can be real adjustment costs imposed by volatile flows of 
capital, or by a sudden outflow of capital.  A greater amount of liquidity will 
magnify any change in market sentiment and increase the risk of contagion.   
Secondly, capital flows may cause excessive changes in, and misalignment of, 
domestic asset prices and may lead to inflationary pressure.  Excessive interest 
rate variability may lead to under-investment in real capital.  Thirdly, free capital 
flows imply a freely floating exchange rate.  New models of exchange rate 
determination that are based on the process of information gathering and 
expectation formation show that the exchange rate can get severely out of line 
with fundamentals, leading to the exchange rate being a source of shocks in the 
economy rather than an absorber of shocks.  It can also cause resource 
misallocation, particularly between the tradeable and non-tradeable sectors
30.  
                                            
28   Barry & Bradley (1997), see Box (1998) for more information on the Irish 
economy. 
29   Box (1999a), Chapman (2000) 
30   See Coleman (1998)  
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However, others argue that strong institutions and well governed banking sectors 
will lessen the risk of open capital markets imposing costs on economies. 
 
Another argument against free capital flows is that they may act as a constraint 
on government actions.  International credit ratings affect the cost of capital 
faced by a country, thus monetary and fiscal policies come under the spotlight.  
On the other hand, free capital flows could be seen as positive constraints on 
government behaviour by making the costs of decisions more transparent.  Other 
concerns are that the accumulation of foreign liabilities may also cause 
difficulties with the current account, as mentioned earlier in this section.  Capital 
flows may also be a source of inequality within a country if foreign interests 
cause rapid asset price inflation, for example in land.  There are also issues over 
ownership
31.  These latter issues will be discussed in more depth in Section 7. 
 
To conclude, free flows of capital, both inward and outward, are another 
important source of productivity improvements.  But they have potential costs.  
Better resource allocation and new sources of ideas and technology must be 
weighed up against possible greater volatility and uncertainty.  Strong 
institutions and well-governed banking sectors may reduce the risks.  A degree of 
home bias exists, which reduces the total volume of cross border capital flows. 
 
Labour 
The final stage of the analysis is to allow free flows of labour across borders.  Of 
all the flows we have looked at, labour is the least likely to ever achieve full 
mobility.  There are important cultural reasons why people stay attached to their 
homeland, and feel threatened by outsiders moving in.  This section seeks to set 
out the benefits and costs of cross border labour movements. 
 
The macroeconomic effects of inward flows are difficult to pin down
32.  Empirical 
estimates of the growth effect of immigration are highly dependant on the 
starting assumptions, particularly whether immigrants increase economies of 
scale.  The overall effect is regarded as a small positive; economic activity overall 
will increase but the effect on per capita incomes is ambiguous, with the effect 
depending on migrants’ personal profiles (skills, assets, education), saving and 
investment habits and consumption habits.   
 
New Zealand seeks immigrants with high human capital and entrepreneurial 
skills in order to maximise the chances of positive growth effects.  These 
attributes also contribute positively to productivity.  Indeed, evidence shows that 
immigrants to New Zealand who have higher skill levels and good English 
proficiency have better labour market outcomes, and the intergenerational 
transmission of skills suggests their children too will perform better in the labour 
market.  Entrepreneurship is more difficult to assess, as asset accumulation 
does not necessarily lead to investment in active ventures.  Many wealthy 
migrants to New Zealand seem to prefer passive investment.  However, even if 
high human capital and entrepreneurship could be easily assessed, New Zealand 
                                            
31   Chapman (2000) 
32   See Box (1999b)  
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still faces the problem of attracting this type of migrant against competition from 
other migrant nations such as Australia, Canada and the US. 
 
Immigration may also improve productivity by contributing to labour market 
efficiency.  Migrants make up a disproportionately large fraction of marginal 
workers whose location decisions arbitrage differences across labour markets.  
US evidence has shown that new immigrants are more likely to choose the 
location that maximises their income, whereas residents and previous migrants 
tend to get stuck in a location and not respond immediately to wage 
differentials
33.   
 
The distributional effects of inward flows of labour may be more important than 
the overall macroeconomic effects.  Theoretically, free labour flows will increase 
pressure for wage equalisation as people move from places with low returns to 
places with high returns.  There is some evidence from the US that immigrant 
inflows depress the employment rate and wages of natives in the same skill 
group
34, but overall there are still vast differences in wages across countries.  
However, there is evidence that wage equalisation already exists if one takes 
labour productivity into account – there are higher wages for labour with higher 




Outward flows of labour also have important implications.  Emigration of skilled 
p eop le i s of t en  r ef er r ed to  as  ‘b r ai ndr a in’  a nd  is  co nsi der ed  t o b e a  n ega ti ve  
influence on growth and productivity in the home country.  Yet these people 
often return to their home country with new skills, knowledge and networks of 
colleagues that have a positive influence on productivity.  This suggests we need 
to think more broadly about what benefits the New Zealand economy.   
Contributions such as overseas experience and lifting New Zealand’s profile 
offshore may be just as important as fiscal measures such as tax paid.  This 
discussion also raises the question of what it means to be a New Zealander – 
whether once someone leaves the country they cease to exist in the official 
statistics and so we lose sight of their achievements and contributions.  This is 
an extremely thorny question, as it ultimately asks of policy – ‘whose welfare are 
we trying to maximise?’  This area is certainly worthy of more discussion and 
debate, and the question of identity is traversed in Section 7 of this paper. 
 
As with flows of capital, we can ask whether labour movements are a substitute 
or complement to trade.  We suggest the latter probably holds, particularly since 
labour maintains an immobile element due to cultural reasons.  As alluded to 
above, emigrants can raise New Zealand’s profile offshore – this may be 
invaluable in building greater trade linkages and demand for New Zealand 
products.  Immigrants can also assist in building trade linkages with other 
countries if they bring entrepreneurial skills, market knowledge and 
contacts/networks from their home country.  It may be important for immigrants 
to have business skills to complement their language skills in order to fully 
                                            
33   Borjas (1999) 
34   David Card seminar – see Box (1999b) pg 11 footnote 
35   Trefler (1993)  
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exploit these trade opportunities.  Empirical evidence suggests there needs to be 
a critical mass of immigrants from a particular country before trade is 
stimulated, but the exact number is unclear.  These immigrants may also need 
to be in the same place/city.  The process of building trade linkages is a long-
term one, requiring on-going effort.   
 
Summary:  New Zealand as a Nation 
Free trade in goods and services yields productivity-improving benefits in the 
form of better resource allocation, specialisation, economies of scale and 
impetus for innovation.  There are also consumer welfare benefits from 
increased choice in the marketplace.  The temporary movement of labour 
associated with goods and services trade brings additional benefits in the form 
of new ideas and foreign contacts and networks.  New Zealand’s program of 
unilateral liberalisation allowed it to start tapping into these productivity 
benefits despite slower movement by trading partners. 
 
Both inter- and intra-industry trade will take place.  Intra-industry trade leads 
to smaller income distribution effects as this type of trade involves shifting 
resources between different varieties of the same industry, rather than shifting 
resources between whole industries.   
Free flows of capital, both inward and outward, are another important source of 
productivity improvements.  But they have potential costs.  Better resource 
allocation and new sources of ideas and technology must be weighed up against 
possible greater volatility and uncertainty.  Strong institutions and well-
governed banking sectors may reduce the risks.  A degree of home bias exists, 
which reduces the total volume of cross border capital flows. 
 
Free labour flows bring productivity benefits in the form of efficient labour 
markets, human capital accumulation, innovation and scale.  However, labour 
flows are more emotive than flows of goods, services and capital – different 
cultures, languages, attitudes and institutions hold the world back from 
complete labour mobility.  Greater movement of people around the world raises 
issues of national identity and what it means to be a New Zealander. This 
creates tricky questions for policy, around whose welfare we are trying to 
maximise.  We believe this is an area ripe for debate. 
 
 
4.3.2  New Zealand as a region 
Now let’s change our perspective and look at New Zealand as a region within a 
larger geographical and economic area.  When we begin to think about New 
Zealand as a region, we need to employ some spatial economic ideas. 
 
Goods and services 
From the discussion above we know that trade in goods and services will see 
countries specialising and perhaps ceasing to produce in certain industries or 
certain niches of industries.  Resources will shift towards the area of 
specialisation.  Adding in the spatial dimension suggests that export-oriented 
firms will feel a greater push to locate in places within New Zealand that have 
good market access, for example close to a port, or particularly good access to  
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raw materials.  This will help to lower costs and improve productivity.  Their 
choice of location will also influence the location decisions of other firms that 
provide goods and services to those exporters or to the workers employed there.   
 
The benefits from agglomeration, as discussed in section 4.2.8, all suggest there 
can be significant productivity improvements if firms, as a result of free trade in 
goods and services, decide to co-locate in particular areas.  These productivity 
improvements are over and above those obtained from simple specialisation and 
resource reallocation between industries. 
 
As only goods and services are moving in this initial stage of the analysis, the 
shifts in the location of resources we will see are within New Zealand, rather than 
between New Zealand and other countries.  This has implications for New 
Zealand’s regional activity levels – some areas may decline while others grow.  
While these shifts will generally have positive effects on productivity overall, 
equity concerns may be raised about regions experiencing a loss of activity.   
 
The use of telecommunications technology to link producers and consumers is 
good news for New Zealand – despite our geographic disadvantage, the use of 
technology may allow us to compete in foreign markets.  However, this must be 
tempered by caveats around how far technology can go in removing the need for 
proximity.  Human contact is still extremely important due to the way 
information and knowledge flow between people.  The most important flows are 
of tacit knowledge and since such knowledge is vague, difficult to codify and 
often only recognised by accident, it is important to transmit it face to face.  It is 
likely that telecommunications will remain a complement to face-to-face contact 
rather than a substitute
36. 
 
For regions within New Zealand, technology could be a double-edged sword.  On 
one hand, technology could allow declining regions to maintain activity levels 
through, for example, providing remote services to the rest of New Zealand and 
perhaps foreign consumers.  On the other hand, given the importance of 
agglomeration benefits, even firms that provide their services remotely may still 
choose to locate in a dense area.  They may need access to technology support 
services, or feel that the business network available in an agglomeration will help 
them identify new customers.  Dense areas also offer consumption benefits, 
which are attractive to workers who like greater variety and diversity.  This leads 
cities to have a larger pool of prospective employees, again making dense areas 
attractive to firms.  These effects would work against declining regions. 
 
Capital 
When we allow the free movement of capital across borders we can begin to ask 
interesting questions about firm location decisions.  With the free movement of 
capital, firms are free to come to New Zealand but are also free to leave.  Taking 
the argument from the ‘goods and services’ section further – if firms choose their 
location based on market access and access to raw materials and factors of 
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production, and if they take into account agglomeration benefits and costs, then 
would they choose to locate in New Zealand?   
 
One way to examine this question more closely is to think about the level of trade 
costs (trade barriers and transport costs) in trade between countries
37.  These 
countries can be described as either ‘core’ or central countries, or as ‘periphery’ 
countries.  When trade costs are high, activity/firms will spread across the core 
and periphery so that dispersed or immobile consumers can be served.  At this 
point the benefits of agglomeration are not high enough to outweigh the costs of 
getting goods to dispersed consumers from a central production point.  When 
trade costs start to fall it becomes easier to separate production from 
consumption and firms that operate under scale economies will choose to gain 
the benefits of agglomeration by clustering in the core.  However, when trade 
costs fall to extremely low levels, the net benefits of agglomeration and proximity 
to others may diminish.  Firms will be less willing to pay high wages in the core 
and may choose to disperse out to the periphery again.  These relationships are 
illustrated in Figure 4 below. 
 
The effect of technology on the relationship between trade costs and 
agglomeration is unclear.  As suggested in the previous section, technology can 
act as a double-edged sword.  It can make it easer to access agglomeration 
benefits remotely and provide goods and services locally (i.e. locate in the 
periphery), or it can make it easier to agglomerate and provide goods and 
services remotely (i.e. locate in the core).  It is up to individual businesses to 
assess their own situations and choose the scenario that best serves them. 
 
Figure 4: Trade costs and firm location 
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The questions are: where on this diagram is New Zealand; and how fast are we 
moving along the curve as trade costs fall?  As a small geographically distant 
economy we could realistically describe ourselves as belonging to the periphery.  
Are firms at the point of wanting or needing to be in New Zealand; that is, are the 
dispersion forces pushing firms to locate in New Zealand?  Or are agglomeration 
forces dominating, and if they are, is New Zealand able to sustain an 
agglomeration of its own or will the country become a declining region on the 
periphery?  Will technology ever reduce the need for proximity enough to make 
mass dispersion to the periphery a viable option? 
 
These questions could reveal a sombre scenario – one where firms seek to locate 
in regional hubs rather than New Zealand so that they may enjoy the benefits of 
agglomeration.  That is, resources may be reallocated and achieve higher 
productivity, but at the same time the overall level of activity in New Zealand 
may drop as these productivity improvements are gained from resources moving 
offshore.  This is even more of a concern if cumulative causation sets in.  This 
would happen when regional decline makes a region even more unattractive, with 
the result being a negative spiral ending perhaps in regional death.  Another 
concern is that increased specialisation resulting from firm exit may make New 
Zealand more fragile and vulnerable to external shocks. 
 
However, we must be careful to conduct a reality check.  The scenario above is 
based in theory.  While theory works on the basis of free capital flows, in reality 
there are often practical reasons for firms to be wary of offshore operations – it is 
harder to operate in a foreign market with different rules, regulations and 
approaches.  These ‘barriers’ to cross border integration are referred to as 
border effects and they play an important role in determining trade and 
investment flows.  These border effects may place upper limits on the movement 
of activity offshore.  Different industries will also prefer different levels of density, 
depending on the type of operation.  This means that those firms who are happy 
operating in a less dense environment will be more inclined to stay within New 
Zealand.  It would be interesting to know how various levels of density appeal to 
different types of firms, both within New Zealand and offshore.  And of course, 
some firms, particularly those involved in natural resource based activities, have 
less ability to relocate. 
 
Empirically, the evidence on ‘footloose’ firms is mixed – some industries, such as 
assembly, seem to follow lower costs around the world, while others seem very 
loyal to their home market.  A recent survey of manufacturing exporters in New 
Zealand found many owners would choose to remain in New Zealand for lifestyle 
reasons or because they felt some sort of ‘social conscience’ in supporting the 
local economy.  This was true even if there were opportunities offshore
38.  This is 
an important reminder that location decisions are complex and the result of 
many factors.  More analysis is needed in New Zealand to determine just how 
mobile firms really are, how many firms move and where they go to and the 
effects of firm departure on remaining activity.  It will also be useful to monitor 
progress in the European Union, as a large natural experiment in the effects of 
integration.   
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Before we move on to discuss cross border flows of labour, we can ask what the 
consequences are of having free capital flows but no labour mobility.  We have 
seen in this section that firms may decide to move offshore to access 
agglomeration benefits.  If people are unable to move, they may find that their 
particular skills are not in demand domestically – there may be higher 
unemployment unless people can retrain.  This does not bode well for a highly 
skilled workforce if New Zealand’s specialisation remains in primary products.  
There are also implications for social spending; lower activity levels suggest 
lower tax revenue, which puts pressure on fiscal initiatives.  This is particularly 
so in a country that does not receive transfers from a larger regional body.  The 
next section explores the consequences of allowing free labour movement. 
 
Labour 
Allowing free movement of labour takes us to the depths of what it really means 
to be a region.  So far the discussion has looked at the consequences of goods, 
services and capital flows in the context of New Zealand as a region of a larger 
space.  We have seen that once factors of production start to move there are 
important consequences for the location of activity.  The true definition of a 
region is where there are high trade flows, a high degree of specialisation and 
capital mobility and a high level of labour mobility.  We now add this last step. 
Lion Nathan Roars off to Oz 
Earlier this year, Lion Nathan shifted its headquarters to Australia.  Also 
this year, Carter Holt Harvey’s packaging division moved its head office 
to Melbourne, while the group’s tissue division had already moved its 
head office there over a year previously. 
 
What is the impact on New Zealand of moves such as these?  Are they 
cause for concern? 
 
One view is that New Zealand is an incubator.  Firms expand to a certain 
point then spread their wings and move offshore.  Since new firms are 
often the most innovative and dynamic, being a business incubator may 
not be a bad thing. 
 
However, in practice, are there enough births of high quality new firms to 
balance the outflow of mature firms?  Does the exit of firms lead to lower 
overall business confidence and investor confidence in New Zealand?  If 
we take the ideas about cumulative causation and the decline of regions 
seriously, could industrial policy be seen in the light of maintaining 
critical mass?  Given that headstarts count when external economies of 
scale exist, could there be a rationale for supporting industries if we 
think increasing openness could erode New Zealand’s activity base?   
 
More work is needed to unpick the story around firm birth, death and 
mobility so that we can begin to answer these important questions.  
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As in the ‘New Zealand as a nation’ discussion, completely mobile labour leads 
to wages equalising across regions as workers move towards higher wages and 
away from lower wages.  This has an important implication – a region can only 
export goods in which they have an absolute advantage (i.e. lower unit labour 
requirements/higher productivity than any other region).  Those regions that do 
not have an absolute advantage in anything will decline
39.   
 
This idea can come as a surprise.  Trade theory usually tells us that comparative 
advantage is the key concept.  That is, countries specialise in and export that 
good in which they have comparative advantage – absolute advantage is not 
needed because low wages will make up for low productivity and the goods will 
be cost competitive.  But in an integrated market where countries begin to look 
like regions it is absolute advantage that matters.  This is because free labour 
flows will stimulate wage convergence across the region – workers will move 
towards higher wages and away from regions with low wages.  Once wages are 
equalised across the region, low productivity is no longer matched by low wages, 
making low productivity areas unattractive to firms.  Locations need to be 
absolutely more productive in some good or service in order to sustain activity. 
 
Changes in tastes or technology can alter the absolute advantage of a region for 
better or worse.  In New Zealand for example, the reduction in the use of coal as 
a fuel has led to the decline of many ‘coal towns’, but aerial top-dressing of 
fertiliser enabled some marginal land to become productive.  However, there are 
other forces at work that suggest regional decline or growth, once started, may 
be self-reinforcing.  Agglomeration forces can mean that a region that loses 
some industries will then become unattractive to other industries, leading to a 
cumulative process of decline.  The level of change needed in tastes or 
technology to reverse this process is unclear. 
 
Applying these ideas to New Zealand, it appears that free labour flows could 
conceivably lead to large-scale emigration as people move offshore in search of 
higher wages.  At the limit, if New Zealand had no absolute advantage in any 
good or service, the country would depopulate.   
 
However, this is a theoretical scenario.  In reality, it is unlikely that labour will 
ever be completely mobile between countries.  Different cultures, languages, 
attitudes and institutions will ensure that cross-border labour mobility will not 
reach ‘within country’ levels
40.  In addition, New Zealand would appear to have 
an absolute advantage in at least tourism and some agricultural products – if 
there was complete labour mobility it is likely that activity would still locate in 
New Zealand.  Look at New Zealand’s specialisation when it was tightly linked to 
the United Kingdom, for example. 
 
What does openness and integration mean in the more realistic case of 
incomplete labour mobility?  More highly skilled people tend to be more mobile 
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than the unskilled.  Thus, skilled and educated workers tend to leave declining 
areas first, reducing job opportunities for those who remain.  Of those remaining, 
some may be unable to move because of barriers to adjustment, for example, 
being unable to afford a house in a bigger town.  Others may not want to move 
for cultural reasons.  Others may stay simply because they are happiest there.  
Whatever the reason though, people remaining in declining regions are likely to 
face persistent unemployment and disadvantage. 
 
The implications of incomplete labour mobility for New Zealand could be that, as 
a region, we lose many skilled workers and are left in decline.  This is particularly 
so if agglomeration forces make offshore locations more attractive to firms as 
well.  The ‘brain-drain’ may become a bigger issue if there is no activity in New 
Zealand for these people to return to.  Cumulative causation could ensure a 
permanent decline.   
 
More work needs to be done to understand international labour mobility, in 
particular ascertaining how mobile various subgroups of the population are and 
what drives their decisions.  Understanding the factors that might draw people 
back to their home country is also important from a policy perspective.  As noted 
in the previous section, lifestyle considerations can be an important driver of 
location decisions.  New Zealand’s attractive physical attributes, smaller 
population and slower pace of life may well swing the balance in favour of 
remaining at home, or returning home after a spell overseas. 
Migration – Practical Policy Issues 
The movement of people across borders can raise some tricky policy 
problems. 
 
For example, a young New Zealander finishes university with a $30,000 
student loan and then moves to the US to work.  Should the New Zealand 
government be able to recover loans from citizens while they are 
overseas in the same way they do for citizens within New Zealand?  How 
would we go about this? 
 
Another interesting policy issue concerns superannuation.  Should a 
retired New Zealander be able to take their super entitlement with them 
if they move overseas in their retirement?  Or, if someone has spent a 
considerable amount of their working life overseas, should they be 
entitled to super payments on their return to New Zealand? 
 
And tax rates – does increasing mobility of people mean that there is 
increased pressure for lower income tax rates?   
 
In the past we traditionally took a ‘New Zealand as a nation’ model, and 
one option under this view was a closed economy.  However returning to 
‘fortress New Zealand’ is no longer an option: technology, 
communications and the global economy have changed too much.  People 
are mobile and this is likely to continue.  Some policies based in the 
nation state paradigm will therefore come under increasing pressure to 
change in the future and we need to be prepared to think about them. 
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As a final comment, the idea that we need to worry about New Zealand declining 
implicitly assumes that we are more concerned with people remaining in New 
Zealand (residents) than we are about New Zealanders scattered about the globe 
(citizens) – while integration may well leave residents worse off, there will be 
many citizens who enjoy great opportunity and advantage from being able to 
migrate themselves or their firms to offshore locations.  Again, we highlight the 
importance of this issue of ‘whose welfare we are optimising’ in an increasingly 
integrated world. 
 
Summary:  New Zealand as a Region 
Analysing New Zealand as a region introduces us to some important new 
concepts around the location of activity.  Looking first at free flows of goods and 
services we find that the stimulation of agglomeration within New Zealand will 
lead to productivity-improving effects beyond those revealed by standard trade 
theory.  However, the movement of resources within New Zealand will cause 
some regions to grow while others decline, and this may cause concern. 
 
Technology opens up opportunities to service markets remotely.  This could be 
important both for New Zealand and for regions within New Zealand.  However, 
face-to-face contact is very important for the exchange of tacit information and 
this type of information is vital for the development of new ideas, processes and 
products.  This suggests limits to the use of technology in overcoming 
geographic disadvantage.  Agglomeration benefits may encourage remote 
service firms to still locate within a dense area. 
 
Analysing New Zealand as a region also reveals further implications of free 
capital flows.  Crucial questions about firm location are raised.  Can a small 
country on the periphery sustain an agglomeration?  Will technology ever 
completely remove the need for proximity?  Are there important border effects 
that put an upper limit on the flow of cross border capital?  Could the loss of 
activity lead to an ongoing negative spiral ending in stagnation for New 
Zealand?  These questions need to be informed by empirical work – how 
footloose is capital in reality, what level of density do various firms need and 
how far can we take these theoretical predictions? 
 
Moving on to labour flows, we find that a ‘true’ region is defined as having a 
very high level of labour mobility.  Integration to the point of regionalisation 
results in decline for those regions with no absolute advantage.  Cumulative 
causation often ensures this decline is permanent.  The level of change needed 
in tastes of technology to reverse this process unclear.   
 
However, as with capital flows, there are border effects that place an upper 
limit on labour mobility.  What does openness mean when there is incomplete 
labour mobility?  It can mean that people will get stuck in a declining region 
and suffer persistent unemployment and disadvantage.  This becomes a larger 
concern if you define the region to be New Zealand.  More work needs to be 
done on understanding international labour mobility and its consequences, so 
that we can assess the likelihood of various theoretical scenarios.  We must 
also remember that New Zealand has some unique consumption benefits, such 
as the uncrowded, relatively clean environment, that may tip the balance in 
favour of staying in New Zealand. 
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4.4 Empirical  evidence 
Evidence on the relationship between goods trade and growth or productivity is 
mixed.  Data problems and disagreement over appropriate measures of 
openness make it difficult to draw decisive conclusions. 
 
Edwards (1997) uses data on 93 countries to look at the relationship between 
openness and TFP.  He uses nine different indices of trade policy and finds that 
they consistently show more open countries have experienced faster productivity 
growth.  The underlying model is that more open countries have a greater ability 
to absorb ideas from the rest of the world.  His results are robust to the use of 
openness indicator, estimation technique, time period and functional form.   
However, Edwards does find that openness is relatively less important than initial 
GDP and human capital in explaining cross-country differences in TFP growth. 
 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) take issue with Edwards’ paper and other recent 
papers that support trade openness.  They find shortcomings in the various 
methodological approaches, and say that it is futile to continue to look for strong 
negative relationships in the data between trade barriers and economic growth.  
While they acknowledge that there is no evidence to suggest trade restrictions 
are systematically associated with higher growth rates, they believe there has 
been a tendency to overstate the evidence in favour of trade openness.   
Rodriguez and Rodrik support looking for contingent relationships such as, do 
trade restrictions operate differently in low vs high income countries?  They also 
suggest looking at plant level data sets to uncover the ways in which trade policy 
affects production, employment and technological performance of firms. 
 
Srinivasan and Bhagwati (1999) respond to Rodriguez and Rodrik by 
commenting that of course there are nuances and qualifications around trade 
theories and models, which suggest trade is not always good for growth.   
However, they say policy judgements tend to opt for openness, because careful 
in-depth studies of individual countries show ‘export promoting’ countries have 
fared better than ‘import substituting’ countries.  Srinivasan and Bhagwati warn 
against overusing cross-country regressions to draw conclusions on the merits of 
openness, saying they are not the best tools for understanding the linkages 
between trade and growth.  Rather, careful country studies should be used.  This 
does not seem to be at odds with Rodriguez and Rodrik’s suggestion of 
contingent relationship studies. 
 
The Australian Productivity Commission (1999) cites several pieces of research 
in support of the claim that higher levels of openness positively affect 
productivity determinants
41.  One paper finds that open and poor countries are 
more likely not to be poor in the future than closed and poor countries.  Another 
finds a positive relationship between trade liberalisation and the performance of 
Australian firms.  The mechanisms they suggested were at work included 
international exposure encouraging greater learning, greater pressures to be 
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efficient and greater selection between firms as weaker firms are forced to adjust 
or decline. 
 
The Productivity Commission also conducted several industry case studies.  In 
the manufacturing sector they concluded that changes in government policy 
brought increased import penetration and greater competition for domestic 
producers
42.  The key responses were to increase specialisation, reorganise 
production, invest in new plant and equipment and improve management and 
workplace organisation.  Reforms were implemented earlier and more quickly in 
the whitegoods industry than in the automotive and textile/clothing/footwear 
(TCF) industries.  As a result the whitegoods industry has experienced significant 
productivity improvement, while the automotive and TCF industries are 
improving more slowly. 
 
In terms of specific ‘negotiated openings’, work has shown there to be gains 
from increased openness with trading partners.  For example, New Zealand’s 
experience with CER is regarded very positively, particularly as a first step in 
increasing the efficiency of the manufacturing sector by exposing it to greater 
competition.  CER was able to ‘sell’ the idea of liberalisation by offering New 
Zealand firms a major benefit in terms of increased access to the larger 
Australian market, thus the agreement was also the crucial breakthrough that 
allowed the development of an irreversible momentum in favour of broad trade 
liberalisation
43.   
 
Quantitatively, CER is also regarded in a positive light.  The Australian Bureau of 
Industry Economics conducted a static economy-wide analysis of the effects of 
CER and found it to have a small but positive effect on Australian and New 
Zealand GDP and economic welfare (as measured by household utility).  Of the 
two countries, New Zealand was estimated to have received the largest benefits 
from CER.  This analysis would have underestimated the gains as it was a static 
analysis only (i.e. looking at simple reallocation of resources between sectors) 
and did not capture the accompanying productivity improvements. 
 
There have also been estimations of the effects of the GATT Uruguay Round 
liberalisation on New Zealand.  MFAT (1994) predicted that the Round would 
produce a modest one-off increase in growth of 2-3% over the following decade, 
with the gains mainly coming through the agricultural sector.  These results are 
sensitive to model assumptions, but there was general agreement that the 
economy would grow as a result of the Round. 
 
Summary:  Empirical Evidence 
The evidence on the effect of openness and integration on growth and 
productivity is mixed.  Cross-country regressions tend to find positive 
relationships but there are concerns over the robustness of the methodology.  
More specific case studies of countries or industries tend to support openness. 
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4.5  Integration and productivity: conclusions 
Productivity is the key to higher incomes, and is thus very important in securing 
higher living standards for New Zealand.  We identify seven mechanisms through 
which openness and integration may affect productivity: 
 
•  resource allocation; 
•  scale, scope and specialisation; 
•  technological advance; 
•  accumulation of human capital; 
•  accumulation of physical capital; 
•  firm organization, management practices and work arrangements; and 
•  plant/firm turnover. 
 
Importantly, there is also a spatial dimension to productivity.  The agglomeration 
of resources and production in a particular location can improve productivity as 
greater density leads to lower transport costs, greater specialisation of 
production and labour, labour market pooling effects and knowledge spillovers.  
This spatial dimension was a motivating factor for splitting the analysis into ‘New 
Zealand as a nation’ and ‘New Zealand as a region’, as we sought to understand 
the implications of viewing New Zealand through different conceptual windows. 
 
While domestic policy has an influence over the productivity-improving 
mechanisms and the spread of activity across space, openness is also important.  
For smaller countries, such as New Zealand, openness may assume greater 
significance than it would for a larger country that suffers less from market-size 
and resource constraints. 
 
Significantly, there may be diminishing returns to openness.  If a country is open 
enough to receive knowledge transfers of the sort required to achieve 
convergence to higher growth and productivity, then further integration beyond 
that may not be important for growth.  It is unclear what the optimal level of 
openness is for New Zealand and so the remainder of the discussion focuses on 
the effects of varying degrees of openness in order to inform the debate. 
 
Looking at the theory on cross border flows of goods, services, capital and labour 
through the ‘New Zealand as a nation’ lens, we find openness generally yields 
productivity improving effects.  However, looking at New Zealand with a spatial 
perspective highlights some additional risks as well as benefits of openness.  In 
particular, capital and labour could move out of New Zealand to more 
agglomerated places, in search of the higher productivity and wages associated 
with density.  While these firms and workers may be more productive offshore, 
the benefits of their productivity improvements are lost to New Zealand. 
 
From the literature we identify four factors that are central in estimating the size 
of the ‘spatial’ risks of openness.  The factors are technology, critical 
mass/agglomeration, absolute advantage and border effects. 
 
1.  Technology is important because it can reduce the need for face-to-face 
contact.  However, this can work two ways – it may reduce the need to be  
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in an agglomeration to tap into productivity benefits, and so make it 
easier for firms to locate in the periphery, or it may reduce the need to be 
near the consumer, thus enabling firms to locate in the core and service 
the periphery market from a distance.  The response of firms to 
technology improvements is crucial for understanding location decisions. 
 
2.  Critical mass or agglomeration levels in New Zealand are another key 
factor in location decisions.  The important question is whether firms are 
able to find suitable levels of density for their needs in New Zealand cities 
and towns, or if they have to go offshore to access that density and its 
benefits.  Different firms have different needs – this has implications for 
the type of firm that may be attracted to New Zealand and therefore the 
structure of the economy. 
 
3.  Absolute advantage is important as it gives an indication of the types of 
activity that would be sustainable in a fully integrated market.  An 
integrated market with full labour mobility will not sustain wage 
differentials, thus those locations that do not have an absolute 
productivity advantage in some activity will decline.  The implication for 
countries is that integration will push their pattern of specialisation 
towards those activities where they have an absolute advantage.  If the 
country as a whole does not have absolute advantage in some activity 
then it will fail to attract firms or workers and will decline.  Again this idea 
has implications for the level and type of activity that New Zealand might 
sustain in the future. 
 
4.  Finally, border effects will affect the amount of cross border flows that 
occur.  Border effects can be thought of as less explicit barriers to 
integration, and include such things as different languages, institutions, 
trust and social capital.  Countries tend to maintain some level of home 
bias because of these border effects – put simply; there is a higher degree 
of comfort in dealing with the familiar.  This may act to place an upper 
limit on the amount of activity that flows out of a country. 
 
We believe more empirical work would shed valuable light on these issues.  In 
particular, work on mobility of firms and people, the levels of density needed for 
various firm activities and the response of firms to technology would be 
extremely useful. 
 
On a broad level, the empirical evidence on the effect of openness and 
integration on growth and productivity is mixed.  Cross-country regressions tend 
to find positive relationships, but there are concerns over the robustness of the 
methodology.  More specific case studies of countries or industries tend to 
support openness. 
 
We believe the ideas in this section are an important step in understanding the 
implications of openness and integration for New Zealand.  While we cannot 
conclude what the optimal level of openness is for New Zealand, we can clearly 
see the benefits and risks of different levels of openness.  The difficulty in 
assessing an optimal point is attaching a level of welfare to each level of  
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openness and its associated risks and benefits.  Not only is utility or welfare 
extremely hard to pin down, we have also raised in this section the question of 
whose welfare we are trying to maximise in an increasingly globalised world.  We 
leave this as food for thought for the reader!  
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5.   Integration and Income Distribution 
The discussion thus far has focussed on the effects of economic integration on 
productivity.  Higher incomes are a central component of higher living standards 
and productivity was identified as the key to higher incomes.  As discussed in 
Section 3, however, there are many other components of well-being.  We now 
turn to the relationship between economic integration and income distribution.  
A classic critique of openness and globalisation, is that openness makes the 
distribution of income more unequal. 
 
It is important to note at the outset that there is no objectively ‘correct’ income 
distribution.  It is a value judgement and reasonable people differ.  What we 
think about distribution and fairness might depend on whether we compare 
ourselves to other countries (and which countries), to our own past (and which 
time period), or use some other yardstick.  As a nation we have traditionally had 
a strong egalitarian ethic and have favoured some degree of redistribution. 
However, not all New Zealanders would view a wider distribution as a bad thing.  
Whatever our views and preferences on this issue, we make them felt through the 
political process.  The job of this section is not to take a position on what a 
preferred income distribution might be, but to draw out evidence about the links 
with openness and highlight issues. 
 
The claim that economic integration causes more inequality is often focused on 
the effect of imports.  The argument is that competition from cheap imports puts 
pressure on wages and jobs in firms that compete in these industries.  Affected 
workers and business owners become poorer as resources are shifted to other 
areas of the economy.  We think of car plants in Thames, woollen mills in 
Mosgiel, and Bendon factories in Te Aroha. 
 
Open capital markets are also cited as cause for concern.  Global capital flows 
permit movement of activity and firms.  While the effect on income distribution 
within New Zealand is unclear, it is argued that global capital flows make 
redistribution more difficult.  The cost of imposing relatively high tax rates in an 
open economy is the risk that investment may flow out of the country in favour of 
economies with lower tax rates.  Some argue that this precludes domestic 
governments from certain policy options and amounts to a loss of national 
sovereignty.  These issues will be discussed in Section 6. 
 
Many also associate income distribution issues with integration in the labour 
market.  The fear is that cheap migrant labour will compete with domestic 
workers, particularly for unskilled jobs.  This seems to have been less of an issue 
for New Zealand than for other countries such as the US, possibly because we do 
not have a large, poor pool of potential migrants on our doorstep.
44 
 
It is true that income distribution in New Zealand has become more unequal.  
                                            
44   Although we do have Pacific Island nations, we seem to be less concerned about 
this than the US is about poor migrants.  It may be the case that New Zealand 
has embraced such a strong pacific identity that we accept further Pacific Island 
immigration as natural and appropriate.  
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How much of this, if any, is attributable to increased economic integration is 
much less clear.  Let’s review the trends and survey evidence on the relationship 
between trade and income distribution. 
 
5.1  Widening income distribution 
Relative to the early 1980s the distribution of incomes in New Zealand has 
become more unequal.  In other words, the spread between the highest and the 
lowest annual incomes has been widening.  The timing of increased inequality is 
concentrated in the late 1980s.  Statistics on the earnings of individuals, the 
market incomes of households and the disposable incomes of households all 
reveal a similar pattern.
45 
  
Rising inequality has been a worldwide phenomenon in industrialised countries.   
However, the increase in New Zealand seems to have been proportionally larger 
than in countries such as the UK and Australia, although direct comparisons are 
problematic.  
  
Changes in income distribution result from the complex interaction of many 
factors. These include changes in household composition, changes in labour 
force participation and qualifications of the population, technological change and 
deregulation in the domestic economy as well as changes to external policy.   
Some of these factors are within the control of government policies, however 
many are beyond government’s control.  Government directly affects the 
distribution of income through tax and transfer policies.  Government policies 
may also have an indirect effect on the distribution of earnings (for example 
where deregulation of product markets alters the relative demand for different 
skill groups).  However, many of the factors driving distributional changes arise 
from market forces, often global in nature, such as technological changes driving 
up the demand for skilled workers. 
 
Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to determine empirically how these causal 
factors interact, and measure their relative impact on income distribution.  The 
timing of growing inequality in New Zealand suggests that policy changes may 
have been a contributing factor.  However, disentangling the effect of policies 
such as trade liberalisation, from other factors influencing the distribution of 
income, is not straightforward. 
 
Despite the complexities involved, some studies have attempted to unpick the 
causes of changes in income distribution.  Traditionally research has looked at 
the relationship between ‘trade and income distribution’, or ‘immigration and 
income distribution’ separately, rather than looking at ‘economic integration and 
income distribution’ as a whole. 
 
When thinking about the effect of openness on income it is important to bear in 
mind that even if some people are worse off in nominal income terms, it is not 
immediately clear that their welfare has diminished.  Openness brings many 
consumption benefits in the form of cheaper products.  People may be able to 
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buy more goods with less income and this should be factored into the analysis 
when looking at the effect of, say, a tariff reduction.  To get a more accurate 
picture, studies would need to examine changes in terms of purchasing power 
rather than simply income. 
  
5.1.1 Overseas  evidence 
International research on earnings distribution finds that trade effects play quite 
a small role in increased earnings inequality over time.  Much of this research 
investigates the effect of trade on the relative earnings of different groups of 
workers in the United States.  The consensus appears to be that trade can 
explain between 5 and 20 per cent of the overall changes in earnings inequality.  




International research is not directly applicable to New Zealand, given 
differences in the degree of openness, and the speed of policy change.  However, 
the international findings suggest caution in attributing too much of the increase 
in inequality to trade liberalisation. 
  
5.1.2  New Zealand evidence 
New Zealand evidence on trade and income distribution is almost non-existent.  
The main exception is recent research by Deardoff and Lattimore
47, which finds 
that trade liberalisation might actually have improved the distribution by 
increasing returns to unskilled labour.  They show that New Zealand industries 
protected under the import-licensing regime were relatively intensive in their use 
of skilled labour.  Conversely, export industries that expanded following 
liberalisation were relatively more intensive in their use of unskilled labour. 
  
They conclude that trade liberalisation skewed wage differentials in favour of low 
skilled workers, especially women, and owners of the factors used in export 
production (owners of land and capital).  Conversely, trade liberalisation reduced 
relative wage rates for qualified workers (especially male workers) employed in 
industries such as metal fabricating that had been protected by import licensing 
regimes. 
  
More research is necessary to assess the full impact of trade liberalisation on 
income distribution in New Zealand.  The Deardoff and Lattimore research does 
not investigate the distributional consequences of changes in who is employed 
and who is unemployed, or the extent to which this was driven by trade 
liberalisation, other regulatory change, or broader economic factors such as 
terms of trade shocks.  Their research concerns the distribution of labour market 
earnings, whereas income also includes the social assistance income received by 
people outside the labour market, and income from capital or other sources.  
Nevertheless, change in the distribution of labour market earnings has been 
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5.2  Winners and losers 
Although the distribution of income in New Zealand has certainly widened over 
the past two decades it is difficult to determine how much of this is due to 
increased openness and economic integration.  International evidence suggests 
trade liberalisation plays a relatively modest role and that a key driver is 
technological change.  Nevertheless, even if openness does not significantly 
widen the income distribution, it is likely to alter the position of individuals and 
groups within it.  Some individuals and groups within New Zealand will benefit; 
others will not.  Change almost inevitably brings winners and losers. 
  
Let’s consider the case of a tariff reduction.  This one change will affect the 
distribution of income through a variety of channels. 
 
Access to cheaper foreign goods such as clothing, footwear and cars confers a 
gain in real income on households as well as direct consumption benefits 
resulting from access to a wider range of goods.  Which consumers benefit most 
from this depends on the particular goods that now face lower tariffs, and the 
consumption patterns of different households.  Typically, however, these items 
represent a large share of expenditure for low income households, so there is an 
inherent bias in the benefits of liberalisation towards these households. 
 
There will be winners and losers in business.  In some cases lower tariffs and 
increased competition may expose a lack of international competitiveness, 
forcing businesses to become more efficient or cease trading.  In other cases 
lower tariffs may reduce the costs of importable inputs to farms and businesses, 
making them more internationally competitive and allowing them to expand their 
output.  Some industries and sectors are likely to benefit, while others are likely 
to lose viability. 
 
Workers will, of course, be affected.  These changes in the mix and level of 
output across firms, industries and sectors will change the demand for labour in 
different industries and different skill levels.  Who wins and loses will depend on 
whether the trend is toward industries employing higher skilled workers or those 
employing relatively large amounts of unskilled labour. 
 
The second round effects of a tariff reduction on income distribution flow 
throughout the economy.  It is possible that the real exchange rate will alter, 
again sending signals to some industries to expand and others to contract.   
Different expansion paths may imply differences in the amount of part time 
employment available and lead to changes in labour force participation rates. 
 
What this example illustrates is that, while the net impact of trade liberalisation 
on New Zealand is unclear, there are likely to be distributional consequences for 
particular groups.  Even determining what these distributional consequences are 
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is not obvious.  However, in general winners from trade liberalisation tend to be 
firms and workers (and potential workers) in exporting industries, as well as all 
consumers of imported goods.  Losers tend to be firms and workers in import 
competing industries. 
 
Part of the problem with the change in income distribution resulting from 
increased openness, is that the costs are likely to be concentrated on relatively 
small groups of workers, while the benefits are more diffuse.  This means that 
the costs are often more visible than the benefits.  It is important to recognise 
both: those who oppose integration on the basis of groups who are negatively 
affected need to be aware of the benefits.  On the other hand, government needs 
to acknowledge that there are likely to be losers as well as winners and consider 
policy responses to ease adjustment for these groups. 
 
5.2.1 Adjustment 
A key issue for policy is whether the losers are permanently disadvantaged by 
the change, or whether the dislocation is a relatively temporary one.  A large firm 
may go out of business as a result of being unable to compete with cheap 
imports, and all its employees may lose their jobs.  This is a serious blow to 
those concerned, however many may be able to find other jobs in their area, or 
retrain, or move to locations where there are jobs, either in their field or in new 
sectors.  If labour market adjustment mechanisms are working well, then 
although the immediate costs for individuals and their community may be high, 
the long term effect is less serious.  Government may nevertheless want to 
consider transitional assistance to help people cope with the temporary shock. 
 
For others, however, the shock may be permanent.  Some individuals and groups 
in society may have limited ability to retrain (eg, unskilled labourers in their 
50s).  There may be inadequate employment locally, and moving location in 
search of work may not be an option (eg, some may have cultural or historical 
connections with particular areas perhaps, or strong family ties).  If the 
mechanisms for labour market adjustment are unavailable then these groups 
may not be able to recover.  The policy responses in this scenario will differ from 
those in which the shock is a temporary setback – some groups may need 
permanent assistance.  The economic gains arising from increased integration 
will be adequate for the rest of society to assist in this way if required. 
 
The ability of displaced groups to adjust, through finding alternative 
employment, will depend on opportunities available elsewhere in their locality, 
their ability and willingness to move to job-rich locations, and their ability to 
retrain.  We need to investigate more closely mechanisms of labour market 
adjustment after a shock.  Do people retrain?  How costly is it?  Do people move?  
It would be illuminating to know the current situation of former Thames car plant 
workers.  Answers to these questions will help us understand the nature of 
shifting patterns of income distribution as a result of openness, and types of 
policy responses that might be appropriate. 
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5.2.2 Regions 
There is an important regional dimension to this issue.  Regions tend to have 
fewer and less diverse employers than larger cities.  Small rural towns will 
sometimes be dominated by only one major employer.  People living in these 
areas are therefore more exposed if this employer closes down.
49  F o r  t h e m ,  
getting another job will often require a change of location, quite possibly to a 
larger town in the region or a city.
50 
 
Theory would suggest that government ensure that there are no impediments to 
movement of labour.  It might provide information on training and employment 
options in other locations, or even assistance with transport and relocation costs.  
The aim would not be to influence people to move to a particular place, but 
rather to not distort the location decision.
51  People should not be trapped in 
depressed areas if they would like to relocate in search of employment, but lack 
the information or means to do so. 
 
However, many would like to see regions within New Zealand survive and prosper 
because they are interested in the place in and of itself.  We may value a New 
Zealand that has people living and working in Southland and the Far North as 
well as the main centres.  Individuals may have strong attachments to certain 
places.  This would lead to quite different policies – government might attempt 
to attract industry to the regions, sometimes in quite direct ways.  There is a 
tension between helping the people (which may imply assisting them to move to 
other areas where there is employment) and valuing the place (which may imply 
some form of regional assistance).  It is important that policy is clear about 
which objective it is pursuing. 
 
5.3 Conclusions 
Income distribution in New Zealand has widened over the past two decades.   
While part of this may be due to increased economic integration, it is very 
difficult to disentangle from the many other factors influencing income 
distribution.  International evidence has attributed perhaps 5 to 20 percent of 
the change in the distribution of earnings to trade.  There is little New Zealand 
evidence on trade and income distribution.  One study finds that trade 
liberalisation in New Zealand might have actually improved the distribution by 
increasing returns to unskilled labour. 
 
Even if some people are worse off in nominal income terms, it is not immediately 
clear that their welfare has diminished.  Openness brings many consumption 
benefits in the form of more and cheaper products.  Income distribution may not 
                                            
49   This does not imply that regional based industries are necessarily more likely to 
be losers than those in cities.  However in cities the adjustment mechanisms are 
likely to operate faster and more effectively.  There are many alternative 
employers, training opportunities etc. 
50   For the economic advantages of agglomeration see Box (2000) 
51   In this context it is an interesting question whether regional policy will help or 
impede labour market adjustment.  
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be the best measure – one would need to look at the effect of changes in terms 
of purchasing power. 
 
Openness, particularly tariff reductions, may not have noticeably widened the 
income distribution, but it has certainly changed the position of individuals 
within the distribution.  There are winners and losers, both in terms of 
individuals, groups within society, and regions within New Zealand.  The costs 
are likely to be concentrated on relatively small groups of workers, while the 
benefits are more diffuse.   
 
A key question is: are the losers permanently disadvantaged, or is the dislocation 
a relatively temporary one?    If labour markets adjust rapidly, through people 
moving or retraining or both, the effect of the shock will be temporary.   
Government may still want to consider temporary assistance to help people cope 
with the effects of integration.  For some the shock may be permanent and they 
may not be able to recover.  We need to study more closely mechanisms of 
l a b o u r  m a r k e t  a d j u s t m e n t  i n  o r d e r  t o  k n o w  w h a t  s o r t  o f  p o l i c y  r e s p o n s e  i s  
appropriate. 
 
In the case of regions there is a tension between helping the people (which may 
imply assisting them to move to other areas where there is employment) and 
valuing the place in and of itself (which may imply some form of regional 
assistance). 
 
Summary:  Income Distribution 
Income distribution in New Zealand has widened over the past two decades.  
Part of this may be due to increased economic integration, although it is very 
difficult to disentangle from the many other factors influencing income 
distribution.  International evidence has attributed perhaps 5 to 20 percent of 
the change in the distribution of earnings to trade. 
 
Although the effect of integration on the overall distribution of income is 
unclear, trade liberalisation is likely to change the position of individuals and 
groups within the distribution, and result in winners and losers.  Consumers 
will benefit, through access to lower priced goods.  Costs are likely to be 
concentrated on relatively small groups of workers in sectors that are no longer 
competitive. 
 
A key question is: are the losers permanently disadvantaged, or is the 
dislocation a relatively temporary one?    If labour markets adjust rapidly, 
through people moving or retraining or both, the effect of the shock will be 
temporary.  Government may still want to consider temporary assistance to 
help people cope with the effects of integration.  For some the shock may be 
permanent and they may not be able to recover.  We need to study more closely 
mechanisms of labour market adjustment in order to know what sort of policy 
response is appropriate. 
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6.   Integration and Decision Making 
6.1  New Zealand the nation state: questions of sovereignty 
A central component of well-being or living standards for individuals is 
autonomy: a sense of choice, freedom and control over one’s life.  Autonomy 
requires that one’s life not be conditioned by external forces.  It does not imply 
complete independence from others, or complete freedom from state control.   
There is often a fine balance between being influenced by forces outside one’s 
self, and being controlled by them; sometimes it is hard to tell when an 
individual is acting autonomously and when they are not.
52  Nevertheless 
autonomy, or liberty, are values that Western democracies hold dear. 
 
At an aggregate level the desire for individual autonomy is often expressed as a 
desire for national sovereignty: to be a citizen of a nation state with control over 
its own affairs.
53  Sovereignty can be defined as: 
 
The power or authority which comprises the attributes of an ultimate arbitral agent – 
whether a person or group of persons – entitled to make decisions and settle disputes 
within a political hierarchy with some degree of finality.  To be able to take such 
decisions implies independence from external powers and ultimate authority or 
dominance over internal groups.
 54 
 
In short, sovereignty is decision-making power.  It is a central concept in the 
modern world order.  Property rights are allocated by nation
55 and it is generally 
assumed that a nation is able to follow its own values, select its political 
arrangements and use its property without interference from others.
56 
 
As in the case of individual autonomy, however, independence of nation states 
from external forces is a problematic concept.  No social or political entity is 
                                            
52  And the issue has never been resolved, as evidenced by the centuries old debate 
between free will and determinism. 
53   The link between individual sovereignty and national sovereignty is not as 
straightforward as it might appear.  In Western democracies, we expect the two 
to occur together.  Higher levels of individual autonomy are associated with high 
national sovereignty.  However there is no necessary connection.  We can imagine 
highly sovereign nation states that deny their citizens basic civil liberties.  The 
relationship between individual and national sovereignty depends entirely on the 
nature of the political hierarchy. 
54 King. 
55   With the exception of ‘global commons’ such as outer space, the seabed etc. 
56   Although this principle is not held consistently.  Nations often believe strongly in 
their own rights to sovereignty but will violate the sovereignty of other nations in 
certain circumstances.  This is usually justified on moral grounds (human rights, 
labour standards) or spillovers (environmental protection).  Those advocating 
moral arguments may defend themselves against the charge of hypocrisy by 
claiming that the situations are completely different – the nations concerned do 
not respect the individual sovereignty of their citizens therefore the principle of 
sovereignty itself justifies interference.  It seems we do not hold the principle of 
sovereignty as inviolable – sovereignty is contingent upon the exercise of it in 
certain ways.  
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entirely independent of every other.  Nations interact and influence each other 
and this need not amount to loss of independence or sovereignty. 
 
Nevertheless, it remains open as to how regularly one sovereign entity may sway another 
before it becomes inappropriate to speak of the latter as ‘sovereign’.
57 
 
It is uncertain exactly how much independence and decision-making power a 
nation needs to be sovereign.  This uncertainty is compounded by the perception 
that national sovereignty is increasingly under threat from globalisation.  In the 
contemporary world the scope for exercise of national sovereignty appears to be 
shrinking: it is not possible for a nation to function as a closed entity, isolated 
from the world at large.  “The effective domains of economic markets have come 
to coincide less and less with national governmental jurisdictions.”
58  I n  a n  
increasingly integrated world the fear is that sovereignty will be diminished 




As nations lose control over their affairs, individuals in those nations fear that, by 
extension, they too will have less control over their circumstances than they used 
to.  It is thought that if options available to domestic governments are limited, 
then options available to the citizens of those governments must also be limited.  
National governments would be less responsive to the full range of preferences of 
their voters (since some options will be closed off), people may feel the political 
processes don’t represent them as well anymore and feel abandoned.
60  
 
The issue of the effect of increasing global integration on individual autonomy is 
an important and interesting avenue in its own right.  The focus of this section, 
however, is on the effect of integration on national sovereignty.   
 
In Section 6.1 we adopt the traditional perspective of the nation state in thinking 
about sovereignty.  Section 6.1.1 discusses the claim that global market forces 
limit the options open to domestic governments.  Section 6.1.2 discusses the 
trend toward international decision making and its effect on sovereignty.  These 
are complicated issues, and Section 6.1.3 concludes that thinking in terms of 
costs and benefits is more useful than the slippery notion of sovereignty. 
                                            
57   King, ibid. 
58   Kahler, pg xv. 
59   There are additional reasons why the concept of sovereignty may have less force 
than it used to.  When sovereignty resides with a democratic Parliament the 
notion of an ultimate arbitral agent becomes circular – the prime minister may be 
the highest power, but higher still are the people, or the electorate, which are at 
the same time the base of the political hierarchy.  It is also diffuse, in that no one 
person or body decides all matters. 
60   This connection between loss of sovereignty for nations and loss of sovereignty 
for individuals is not at all clear.  As argued in an earlier footnote, there is no 
necessary relationship.  Globalisation is often seen as reducing national 
sovereignty and consequently also reducing the individual sovereignty of citizens.  
However, it’s not obvious that individual autonomy fares worse the more remote 
the decision maker.  In some cases reducing national sovereignty actually 
increases the individual autonomy of citizens, by subjecting the worst excesses of 
nation state power to international scrutiny and human rights pressure.  
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Section 6.2 takes the newer perspective of New Zealand as a region and in doing 
so we find that questions of sovereignty are recast as issues about the level of 
governance at which decision-making is best carried out. 
 
6.1.1  Sovereignty and global market forces 
As cross-border flows increase, governments have greater difficulties trying to 
control what happens within their borders.  There are concerns about the effects 
of both inward and outward flows. 
 
Outward flows 
Global capital flows have risen dramatically over the past 15 to 20 years.
61  
Portfolio investment (so called ‘hot money’) moves around the world extremely 
rapidly in response, partially, to relative economic conditions.  Direct investment 
is slower to move, but will also respond to differences between economies.   
Conditions favourable to investment include stable macroeconomic 
environments, liberal regulations and low taxation.  If nations want to retain 
domestic investment and attract foreign investment they will therefore 
emphasise these features in their policies.  Furthermore, policies that are 
favourable to investment may be particularly important for small geographically 
isolated countries such as New Zealand.  Lower tax rates, reduced regulations 
and more flexible markets may be necessary to compensate for natural 
disadvantages such as lack of economies of scale, high transport costs and lack 
of access to large export markets. 
 
The perceived threat to national sovereignty from these global capital flows lies 
in the fact that they place limits on domestic policies.  Governments are voted in 
on the pledge that they will carry out certain policies.  However, it is harder to 
impose taxes, minimum wages, environmental restrictions and so on in an open 
economy, where investment is free to flow out of those countries and into 
countries without such policies.  Although nations are still technically free to 
follow whatever domestic policies they choose, they do so at their peril.  New 
Zealand pays great attention to international ratings agencies, reflecting 
awareness that our credit rating will affect economic prosperity.  In short, the 
concern is that world financial markets generate economic pressures that 
override domestic policies. 
 
It may be argued that labour mobility creates similar incentives for policy.  If a 
nation wants to retain its best and brightest, as well as attract world-class 
experts from other countries, it is prudent to follow certain policies.  In 
particular, it has been argued that the threat of brain drain limits redistribution.  
If taxation is too progressive those at the top end will relocate.  As well as 
directly bearing on issues of income distribution, it affects sovereignty by 
limiting options open to governments. 
                                            
61   For further discussion of the trends see Plater and Claridge (2000)  
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What can we make of these arguments?  Do global capital and labour markets 
and the risk of outward flows reduce domestic choices and therefore sovereignty? 
 
It is undeniably true that portfolio investment responds to conditions and 
policies in domestic economies.  If governments are interested in this sort of 
investment they will therefore keep their policy settings within the broad 
parameters necessary to attract it.  This is a limitation.  It may be a positive one.  
Openness provides a restraint on the potential abuse of power by governments, 
since the consequences and costs of their actions are immediately apparent.   
The highly controlled and closed environment of the Muldoon era allowed the 
costs of his policies to be hidden.  Muldoon’s policies would not have been 
sustainable in an open environment.  In this sense global markets encourage 
such things as the Fiscal Responsibility Act and other instruments for stable 
government; they promote transparency and bind commitment into the future.  
The fact that there are international pressures to run stable and consistent 
macroeconomic and fiscal policies runs with what is good for the domestic 
economy, not against it. 
 
It is less clear that direct investment and labour respond in the same way as 
portfolio investment to domestic policies.  Location decisions for firms and 
people are based on a range of factors; it is the total package that matters.   
Different people are attracted by different policy mixes.  Many countries in the 
EU have high tax rates but retain people and investment.  It is far from clear 
what policies a government wishing to retain and attract firms and skilled labour 
would pursue.  Extremely redistributive policies are likely to be thwarted by firm 
and labour mobility.  However, a government can still spend significantly on 
social welfare programmes in an open economy if they are paid for by the 
immobile or valued by the mobile.  Mobile factors mean that redistributive 
policies will need to have a broader base of support: again, it is not clear that 
this is a bad thing. Global markets set limiting parameters around some 
government actions, while being consistent with a wide range of more moderate 
policy settings, including a considerable degree of redistribution. 
 
We can conclude that, to some degree, open factor markets influence the viable 
options available to domestic governments.  Does this mean that we therefore 
have diminished national sovereignty?  Here we come up against the difficulty 
raised when we tried to define sovereignty: sovereignty does not entail that all 
choices are open to us; it does mean we have choices.  Exactly how much choice, 
and what sort of choices, do we need to be a sovereign nation? 
 
Choices are always limited; as individuals and as a nation we are always 
operating in a world we cannot control.  This was true before globalisation, as 
after.  In a closed economy we had a narrow range of consumption goods, 
reduced capacity to borrow and invest, fewer resources in general, and what 
resources we did have were poorly allocated.  In an open economy we have the 
pressures of global markets to limit us, as discussed above.  As a nation, our 
bundle of viable options has certainly changed.  Have we lost sovereignty 
because of this change?  Probably not.  Given that choices have always been  
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limited, if we ever had sovereignty, we still have it now.  We may reasonably 
worry that the forces that shape our world are changing and wonder how we 
should best respond to the new environment.  But it is confusing the idea of 
sovereignty to say we have no choices here. 
 
Inward flows 
Open capital markets and the threat of more open labour markets have led to 
concerns about the effects of investment and people flowing into New Zealand as 
well as out of it.  There are arguments that inward flows also reduce sovereignty 
through reduced domestic choices and control. 
 
A common source of opposition to foreign direct investment (FDI) is the worry 
that New Zealand will become ‘owned by foreigners’.
62  Non-New Zealanders 
buying assets, and in particular ‘strategic’ assets, will reduce New Zealanders’ 
control over the country’s resources.  The fear seems to be that if we lose control 
of the bulk of the country’s resources to foreigners, we will lose decision-making 
power and sovereignty to foreigners.
63  An issue for New Zealand is that direct 
investment, particularly in land, may also have Treaty of Waitangi implications. 
 
                                            
62   Portfolio investment doesn’t tend to evoke the same concerns, as it is not usually 
associated with the degree of control that direct investment is. 
63   The concern tends to become bound up in issues of privatisation vs Government 
ownership as well.
   
  60 
 
 
In response to the concern that inward flows will reduce sovereignty, we have 
chosen to place limits on direct overseas investment in New Zealand, and 
particularly on land sales.
64  There are prohibitions on certain types of foreign 
investment (fishing rights and the ‘kiwi share’ in Telecom and Air New Zealand).  
Other classes of investments require the approval of the Overseas Investment 
Commission (OIC), although in practice this has not served to place significant 
                                            
64   An alternative might have been the Cook Island model.  They have a law that you 
can’t buy or sell land (can lease up to 100 years). The land is inefficiently used 
and broken up into small units but nevertheless not owned by foreigners. 
All Investment is Not Equal 
Peoples’ concern about losing decision-making power and control over 
the domestic resources of their own countries was a key factor behind 
the failure of the OECD-sponsored Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI) in 1998.  The purpose of the MAI was to establish rules to manage 
the perceived risks arising from the further freeing of international flows 
of private foreign direct investment (FDI).  To this end, it would have 
placed additional limits on the freedom of signatory governments to 
impose or maintain unreasonable restrictions on such flows, similar to 
the rules governing international trade in goods and services operated by 
the World Trade Organisation.  Like the WTO’s rules-based system, the 
MAI would have provided a framework within which smaller economies 
could exercise their rights.  The MAI was based on a non-discrimination 
principle – signatories would have to treat foreign investment the same 
as domestic investment.  However, as negotiations on the MAI developed, 
reservations to non-discrimination were built in to the draft agreement to 
take account of governments’ strategic, cultural and identity concerns. 
 
There was strong and well coordinated opposition to the MAI throughout 
the world, including in New Zealand.  Groups had disparate motivations 
for opposing the MAI.  One of the main concerns was the belief that FDI 
removes peoples’ decision-making power and control over the domestic 
resources of their own countries.  Other concerns included the belief that 
FDI leads to exploitation of vulnerable groups in societies and 
environmental degradation.  The concerns of opposition groups were 
increasingly taken up by politicians and officials and support for the MAI 
was steadily eroded. 
 
The ultimate demise of the MAI in 1998 can be partly related to the 
strength of opposition and concerns about a loss of national sovereignty 
as a result of FDI.  It was also due to the desire of many governments to 
include in the MAI a plethora of exemptions and reservations to the 
principle of non-discrimination, which in the end would have made the 
agreement unwieldy and unlikely to deliver substantive advances towards 
liberalisation.  Finally, the demise of the MAI was also a function of the 
fact that the OECD is not a negotiating forum and, as a result, was not 
equipped to manage the process.  
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restrictions on foreign investment.
65  These restrictions reflect the concern New 
Zealanders have about some types of foreign investment.  They also remind us 
that we do have some control here: if the concerns about foreign ownership 
outweigh the economic gains of FDI we have the option of limiting it. 
 
Of course it is unclear just how much concern New Zealanders actually do have 
about foreign ownership.  New Zealanders’ actions can contribute to their own 
loss of sovereignty.  When New Zealanders choose to buy imported goods, or to 
sell their assets to foreigners, or to buy overseas assets they are exercising their 
individual sovereignty but, one could argue, losing control over production in the 
process.  This indicates a revealed preference for individual sovereignty over 
national sovereignty. 
 
Inflows of people resulting from open labour markets can also provoke fear and 
opposition.  However, unless immigrants arrived in such vast and cohesive 
groups that they had a major impact on parliamentary political outcomes, the 
issues of open labour markets are not primarily sovereignty issues.
66  It is feared 
that immigrants will take jobs that should be filled by New Zealanders; this 
relates to distribution issues, discussed in Section Five.  It is also feared that 
immigration will change and threaten our culture and what makes us New 
Zealanders; this relates to issues of national identity and will be discussed in 
Section Seven. 
 
How realistic is this fear that capital inflows will result in loss of our productive 
resources to foreigners?  How much foreign investment would it take?  That is a 
difficult empirical question about which this paper can offer no view.  The 
interesting issue for us is the relationship between resources and sovereignty, 
because whether or not foreign ownership reduces sovereignty depends on the 
degree to which decision-making power and independence requires control over 
assets. 
 
One view is that political authority is more important than resources: as long as 
you have a parliament and an executive you can always legislate, regulate and 
tax.
67   
 
However resources give you real choices.  Is sovereignty worth anything if you do 
not have the economic clout to back it up if threatened?  The cynical view is that, 
to have genuine decision-making power as a nation, you need enormous 
resources.  Under this view, a very few politically and economically powerful 
nations have true sovereignty; all other nations have sovereignty, in effect, by 
permission of the powerful.  To exercise sovereignty you need power; the more 
power the more sovereignty. 
 
                                            
65   See Plater and Claridge for further discussion, and Chapman for a thorough 
description of the rules governing FDI in New Zealand. 
66   Clearly inflows of people have altered the power balance in nations: New Zealand 
Maori and native Fijians, for example, have lost sovereignty to newcomers.  
However within modern parliamentary democracies controlled immigration is less 
likely to have such dramatic political effects in short time frames. 
67   At the extreme, you could even nationalise strategic assets.  
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6.1.2  Sovereignty and political decision making 
International market forces have raised concerns about national sovereignty 
because they appear to limit domestic choices.  We have argued that sovereignty 
does not entail limitless choices.  Nations have always operated within the 
parameters of the options actually open to them and the pressures upon them.  
In a changing world those options and pressures have changed. This may require 
some adjustment, but it is a mistake to view it in terms of loss of sovereignty. 
 
A more serious threat to national sovereignty, however, may be the increasing 
trend toward international decision-making.  Governments have attempted to 
manage the tensions between global forces for integration and national 
autonomy by international co-operation.  Over the past few decades there has 
been a proliferation of multilateral organisations and agreements.  These include 
functional groupings devoted to particular issues (eg, IMF, ILO), regional 
arrangements (eg, EU, NAFTA, APEC), semi-global co-ordinating organisations 
(United Nations, WTO, OECD) and innumerable bilateral relationships (eg, CER). 
 
International organisations and agreements tend to set parameters around the 
actions of nation states.  The concern is that this represents a transfer of power 
and decision making from nation states to international organisations and 
therefore harms sovereignty.  Types of agreements reached, ranging in order of 
their departure from national autonomy, include mutual recognition, monitored 
decentralisation, coordination, explicit harmonisation and mutual governance.
68   
 
                                            
68   See Kahler, pg xxii  
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Does signing up to international agreements limit sovereignty?  One view is that 
it does not.  No parliament can bind another.  While a nation still has its 
parliament it can retreat from international commitments at any time.  Joining 
an international organisation merely raises the costs of bailing out in the future.  
In the end, adherence is voluntary; nations cannot be compelled. 
 
The principal distinction between national and international law is in the area of 
enforcement.  National laws have courts to watch over them.  The WTO, however, 
is not a court.  It has no power of enforcement.  If a member refuses to comply 
with the rules it previously volunteered to follow, all the WTO can do is approve a 
request by the complaining member to impose sanctions.  This is an option that 
member governments have always been able to wield unilaterally.  Failure to 
comply with a panel ruling does not result in expulsion from the WTO. 
The Face of Discontent 
A particularly high profile focus for concern over loss of national 
sovereignty is the World Trade Organisation.  This is often played out in 
the arena of environmental protection. 
 
One function of the WTO is to help members settle disputes under rules 
they all agreed to follow. WTO rules place few constraints on a member 
protecting its environment against damage from domestic production or 
from the consumption of domestic or imported products.  Members can 
also pursue non-protectionist regulatory objectives that restrict trade as 
long as there is either scientific evidence supporting the measure or the 
measure is a provisional response during a period of scientific 
uncertainty. 
 
Environmentalists consider that the WTO encourages governments to 
converge to international standards because uniformity reduces the 
incidence of trade disputes. If these standards serve as ceilings, not 
floors, the incentive for governments to experiment and become genuine 
pacesetters in environmental law is reduced. 
 
The dispute over beef hormones illustrates this tension. In 1998, the WTO 
found that while a country has broad discretion in choosing levels of 
biosecurity, the ban on hormone-produced meat by the EU was not 
rationally related to the risk assessments performed. The EU did not 
comply with the ruling. After a period of negotiation, in 1999 the dispute 
panel authorised the USA to suspend tariff concessions to the EU 
equivalent to the annual harm to U.S. exports resulting from the ban: US$ 
116.8 million. 
 
Has sovereignty been violated?  Environmentalists might say yes- 
international pressure was bought to bear on the EU for a decision about 
their own environment, which affected domestic and imported products 
alike.  Others would say no – the WTO is a club the EU freely chose to 
join, agreeing to abide by its rules.  And what’s more, despite the costs, 
they maintained the ban.  
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Another view is that, while it may be technically true that nations can change 
their minds, the reality is somewhat different.  Although international law 
generally provides a mechanism for nations to back out of commitments, there is 
wide agreement that governments should keep their promises.  The costs of 
withdrawing from some international commitments are extremely high.  Where 
commitments are reciprocal others, who were the beneficiaries of our 
commitments, may withdraw some of the benefits of commitments they have 
made to us.  Although New Zealand could choose to pull out of the WTO on 
sovereignty grounds, the economic and diplomatic cost of this course of action 
makes it prohibitive.  We normally think of choices as viable options, not merely 
technical ones.
69  Entering into international agreements, therefore, does 
effectively limit domestic behaviour. 
 
However, as argued previously, sovereignty does not entail that all options are 
open, that we could reasonably change our minds at any point, or that we are 
completely independent.   We generally consider that individuals are able to 
enter into contracts without loss of autonomy.  In fact a contract could be seen 
as an expression of autonomy, since it will be entered into because the individual 
expects the agreement to increase their welfare.  Individuals in the nation state 
have permanently limited their personal freedom via a ‘social contract’ with the 
state because they reap the benefits the state provides.
70  Nations too, often find 
it in their best interests to subject themselves to a contract or external constraint 
in the expectation of even greater benefit.
71 
 
                                            
69   In the sense that if someone was holding a gun to your head you could choose not 
to give them your wallet, but this is not what we would consider a genuine choice.  
70   Nations arguably have more autonomy in the WTO than individuals do in a 
western democracy.  
71   Again, the degree to which this is consistent with individual sovereignty depends 
on the degree to which the government mandate is the result of democratic 
political processes.   
More Sovereignty and Economic Integration Too 
Since the break-up of the Soviet bloc, we have witnessed the formation 
of a great number of new nation states.  In Eastern Europe the political 
unit is getting smaller – nations states built on greater cultural and 
ethnic homogeneity are emerging.  At the same time almost all of these 
Central and Eastern European nations are queuing up to join the 
European Union because of the economic advantages they perceive in 
doing so.  While the political unit is shrinking, the economic unit appears 
to be enlarging.  Pursuing economic integration is consistent with 
increased sovereignty. 
 
A similar theme is apparent in the case for Scottish independence.  The 
movement believes they will have more sovereignty as part of a bigger 
unit centred in Brussels.  Why be a disadvantaged region of the United 
Kingdom when you can be a sovereign nation in the EU?  
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Discussion of international agreements and organisations simply in terms of 
sovereignty is therefore not particularly useful.
72  Signing up to international 
norms sets parameters on national policy.  It will therefore only be undertaken 
for a greater expected benefit.  This may amount to a loss of sovereignty (in the 
same sense that signing a contract limits an individual), but the real question is 
whether the benefits outweigh the costs of signing. 
 
6.1.3  The way forward – thinking about costs and benefits 
Assessing the benefits and costs of signing up to international agreements is no 
easy matter.  Many factors will enter into our calculation of national interest.  
These include likely economic effects (the implications for growth, jobs, living 
standards etc), impact on other social goals (sovereignty, identity, the 
environment, etc), as well as a myriad of pragmatic ‘tactical’ considerations 
(effect on our negotiating position in other areas etc).  Some of these have been 
discussed at a general level in this paper; others are outside its scope.  When 
considering particular international agreements all these factors come together 




Furthermore, even if in principle the benefits are calculated to outweigh the costs 
if a particular area is liberalised, the devil is in the detail.  If the agreement 
designed to implement the liberalisation is badly formulated, requiring high 
compliance costs or leading to bureaucratic and legal battles, then the 
agreement will deliver bad outcomes for New Zealanders. 
 
So how do we avoid badly designed treaties?  There will be general principles 
and questions we can ask ourselves that might guide our assessment of costs 
and benefits. 
 
•  How does the proposal support domestic policy priorities, both economic 
and social? 
•  What are the dynamic impacts? 
•  How does it cohere with the rest of our international commitments and 
relationships?   
•  The possibility of maintaining sovereignty over time depends on 
democratic involvement and voice in the system.  To what degree will New 
Zealand have a voice in the institutions that result?   
•  Are the processes transparent? 
•  How reversible is the commitment?   
•  To what degree is the declaration worth the resources being put into it? 
                                            
72   And in fact some objections to international cooperation on sovereignty grounds 
may be less about sovereignty and more about not liking the decision or policy. 
People employ any argument that supports their general position, making them 
hard to disentangle. 
73   Consider the original New Zealand Australia Free Trade Area (NAFTA) negotiated 
in the 1960s, which effectively locked into place all the barriers that existed in 
both countries.  
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•  Is the agreement outcomes based?  It is preferable to give nations the 




In New Zealand, the power to take treaty action rests with the Executive.   
However the Government has recently decided that all multilateral treaties that 
have been considered by Cabinet must be presented to the House before formal 
steps of ratification, accession, acceptance, approval, withdrawal or denunciation 
can proceed.
74  The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade may also decide to 
present major bilateral treaties of particular significance for consideration by the 
House.  The Government will not take any binding treaty action until the relevant 
Parliamentary Committee has reported, or until 15 days have elapsed since 
tabling. 
 
Treaties presented before the House for consideration must be accompanied by 
a National Interest Analysis.  This sets out reasons for New Zealand to become 
party to the Treaty (or denounce/withdraw), advantages and disadvantages, 
obligations resulting from signing, economic, social, cultural and environmental 
effects, costs, the possibility of any future protocols, implementation 
implications, and provisions for withdrawal or denunciation.  It is prepared by 
the lead Department in consultation with others. 
                                            
74   CAB (97) M 46/11G(1) and CAB (00) M 5/1E(1) 
Trans Tasman Mutual Recognition Agreement 
 
The Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement (TTMRA) came into 
effect on 1 May 1998.  The objective is to mutually reduce regulatory 
barriers to the movements of goods and services between Australia and 
New Zealand.  The Agreement means that: 
 
•  i f  a  g o o d  c a n  l e g a l l y  b e  s o l d  i n  N e w  Z e a l a n d  i t  c a n  b e  s o l d  i n  
Australia (and vice versa); and 
 
•  if a person is registered to practise an occupation in New Zealand 
then they are entitled to practise that occupation in Australia (and 
vice versa). 
 
There are currently 25 product standards, information standards and 
product bans that are not immediately capable of mutual recognition, 
which are covered by a special exemption.  The TTMRA include a 
process for working through outstanding items with a view to 
recommending mutual recognition, harmonisation or continuing 
exemption. 
 
The TTMRA is a unique agreement that recognises the mutual 
confidence that Australia and New Zealand have in each other’s 
regulatory settings. It facilitates integration while providing, through the 
exemptions, for retention of sovereignty in areas that are of particular 
importance to one or the other nation.  
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The National Interest Analysis is the key vehicle through which costs and benefits 
of international co-operation with respect to a particular area are set out, 
debated and worked through.  It is also the key document that many Ministers 
and parliamentarians will read and base their discussion on.  It is therefore 
crucial that this analysis is robust and that consultation is well executed.  We 
need to be very clear about what we are giving up and what we are gaining.  This 
calculus runs well beyond the policy area traditionally thought of as ‘external 
policy’ and it is therefore vital that agencies undertaking the analysis are 
thinking broadly about the issues and liaising effectively with all relevant parties. 
 
Although assessment of the costs and benefits of international cooperation must 
ultimately be carried out on a case by case basis, a useful area for further work 
might be the development of a framework or taxonomy for how we think about 
these issues.  Questions of regulatory cooperation and Trans-Tasman 
harmonisation have been raised as particular areas worth addressing in more 
detail.  
 
Summary:  Sovereignty 
National sovereignty is the decision making power of nation states.  There is a 
concern that the independence and sovereignty of nation states is diminished in 
an increasingly integrated and global world. 
 
As cross border flows of capital and labour increase there is concern that 
domestic policy options will be reduced.  The fear is that world financial and 
labour markets, and the risk of outward flows that openness creates, generate 
economic pressures that place limits on domestic policies.  There are also fears 
that inward flows will reduce sovereignty through foreigners buying assets and 
reducing domestic choice and control. 
 
To some degree global capital markets do limit choices.  This may not be a bad 
thing if it supports domestic policy and binds commitment from successive 
governments.  More fundamentally, sovereignty does not require limitless 
choices.  Nations have always operated within the parameters of the options 
actually open to them and the pressures upon them.  In a changing world these 
options and pressures have changed.  This may require some adjustment, but 
the idea that we had sovereignty and now we are losing it is largely illusory. 
 
A more serious threat to national sovereignty may be the increasing trend 
toward international decision-making.  International organisations and 
agreements tend to set parameters around the actions of nation states.  The 
concern is that this represents a transfer of power and decision making from 
nation states to international organisations and therefore harms sovereignty. 
 
Thinking about international decision making in terms of sovereignty, however, 
isn’t very useful.  Signing up to international norms sets parameters on national 
policy.  It will therefore only be undertaken for a greater expected benefit.  This 
may amount to a loss of sovereignty (in the same sense that signing a contract 
limits an individual) but the real question is whether the benefits to New 
Zealand outweigh the costs of signing.  Developing a framework or taxonomy for 
how we think about the costs and benefits of international cooperation is an 
important area for further work.  
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6.2  New Zealand the region: questions of levels of governance 
Discussions of sovereignty are very much based within the perspective of New 
Zealand as a nation state.  The issue is then about when it is in New Zealand’s 
interests to give up some sovereignty in order to reap the benefits of cooperation 
with other nations. 
 
However, in Section Three, we introduced a second conceptual window – that of 
viewing New Zealand as a region within a larger area.  Under this view, decision 
making location can be seen as a series of concentric circles: decisions can be 
made by individuals, local governments, nation states, international 
organizations and at many other levels in between.  It is clear that different 
decisions need to be made at different levels.  Nations decide on the punishment 
for burglary, local governments decide which day is rubbish day and individuals 
decide what to wear when they get up in the morning.  There may also be 
decisions that are most sensibly made at a supranational level. 
 
By taking the emphasis off the nation state the issue is opened up.  Rather than 
trying to decide when New Zealand should give up some of its sovereignty to 
international fora, the question can be recast as an issue about at what level of 
governance should decision-making be carried out.  There is no presumption that 
it will necessarily be the nation state, and increasingly we are seeing states 
devolving to lower levels of government as well as cooperating internationally 
with higher levels.  Of course, often the nation state is the optimal level of 
governance, but by looking at the question in a different way we might pick up 
things we’ve missed.  The discussion that follows is intended to stimulate 




There is a long tradition in Western democracies for individual autonomy.
76  
People should be free to pursue their own choices consistent with the 
preservation of similar freedoms for others.  The default is for the state to stay 
out of the lives of individuals unless there are good reasons for interference.   
There are good reasons for interference however, if it can be established that the 
benefits of intervention outweigh its costs.  Economics points to the 
establishment and maintenance of property rights, public goods and commons, 
externalities and information failures.  Political theory argues over how much 
state intervention is justifiable and for what purpose, but even proponents of the 
most minimal state acknowledge a role for the state in such things as law and 
order
77.  Once it is established that there is a role for government the question of 
which level of government remains. 
 
The principle of subsidiarity
78 argues for governance and decision-making to be 
located at the lowest level possible, unless there are reasons why it should be 
located at a higher level.  Devolved decision-making allows for better private 
                                            
75   For another cut on this question see Lawrence, Bressand & Ito. 
76   Kant, Hume, Mill, Rawls, etc. 
77   eg, Nozick’s ‘night watchman state’ 
78   I believe this term originally came from the Roman Catholic Church, to describe 
the appropriate jurisdiction of the church in individuals’ lives!   
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preference revelation and respects diversity in preferences, conditions and 
values.  The smaller the decision-making unit, the better preferences are 
reflected in decisions.  Furthermore, devolution increases government 
accountability.  It preserves autonomy and aids communal solidarity and 
identity.  Devolution allows utilisation of local knowledge and promotes 
experimentation.  This would create a presumption for local government over 
national, and for national government over international.  Like individuals, 
nations should be sovereign over their own affairs unless there are good reasons 
why not.  Nevertheless, there are many cases where nation states will choose to 
give up some control over domestic policy because there are greater gains to be 
had. 
 
Theories of fiscal federalism assert that the jurisdiction of decision-making 
should correspond to the jurisdiction of effects.
79  Kerr, Claridge and Milicich
80 
have further developed this idea.  They identify three principles and criteria for 
determining optimally efficient levels of decision-making and cost bearing. 
 
1  Balanced decision-making: decisions should be located, where possible, 
with the jurisdiction of effects and costs.  People who make decisions 
should be those who receive benefits and bear costs.  This will avoid 
interjurisdictional externalities that could lead to under or over provision 
of a public good. 
 
2  Informed decision-making: good decisions reflect all the relevant 
subjective and objective information.  Those who experience the effects 
should make the decisions, since it is they who have subjective 
preferences about the issue.  People with the skills and resources to 
access objective information should also be involved in decision-making. 
 
3  Cost effective decision-making: when costs of decision-making are high 
and preferences are relatively homogeneous, decision-making at a higher 
level can save on duplication costs. 
 
Local decision-making is therefore likely to be optimal when: 
 
•  There are no externalities; 
•  Objective information is held locally, or is unimportant; 
•  Subjective preferences are important and vary; 
•  Costs of decision making are low. 
 
Central decision-making is likely to be optimal when: 
 
•  There are externalities; 
•  Objective information is held centrally and is important; 
•  Subjective preferences are homogeneous; 
•  Costs of decision making are high. 
 
                                            
79   Oates, (1999) 
80   Kerr, Claridge & Milicich (1998)  
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Sovereignty is mentioned briefly; Kerr et al acknowledge that if decision-making 
in itself is something that people value strongly then this will weigh in the 
balance. 
 
In spite of the many arguments in favour of centralised decision making and 
implementation we may still bias toward devolving decision making to local 
communities if the social importance of local identity and control outweighs the 
social choice and efficiency benefits of more centralised control.
81 
 
Kerr et al have applied these principles to issues of devolution within nations but 




6.2.1  Balanced decision making 
Provision of a public good or avoidance of a ‘public bad’ will be optimal if 
decisions are made by the people who feel the effects, and these same people 
also bear the costs.  Balanced decision-making will avoid interjurisdictional 
externalities.  Externalities and public goods may be international in scope.   
International cooperation is therefore important to internalise international 
spillovers and provide international public goods.  Let’s consider some 
examples. 
 
Environmental concerns are a classic example of an area that has long been 
regarded as appropriate for international cooperation.  Without co-ordination, 
pollution will be overproduced because the producer does not bear the costs of 
negative externalities to other nations.  In a simple two-country situation Coasian 
theory would suggest that this problem could be resolved and the optimal level 
of pollution reached if the party without the property rights compensates the 
other.  However, because pollution generally affects many countries, free rider 
problems are likely to arise making more explicit coordination necessary.   
International environmental agreements and fora aim to enlarge the decision-
making jurisdiction to include all those affected and so provide a mechanism for 
affected nations to express preferences.
83 
 
                                            
81   Kerr et al, (1998) pg 5 
82   The major difference, when applying the framework to international decision-
making, is that in the local/national devolution case we are optimising for the 
national level, whereas in the national/international case we only care about what 
is optimal for our nation, not the whole planet.  Furthermore, there isn’t a strong 
trans-national forum equivalent to ‘central’ decision making in the central/local 
case.  The closer analogy would be if local regions within New Zealand were 
deciding when it was optimal for them to club together.  This difference changes 
some of the analysis.  For example, it makes issues of interjurisdictional 
spillovers more difficult because no overarching government has the mandate to 
take the interests of all those affected into account.  It also makes redistribution 
largely voluntary – coercion is more difficult (we may not think this is a bad 
thing!).  Nevertheless, the general principles provide a useful way of thinking 
more deeply about these sorts of decisions. 
83  Another example would be enlarging the jurisdiction of financial risk externalities, 
through the IMF.  
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Another case where international institutions and alliances have long been active 
is in security matters.  Security is an international public good.  The benefits 
often extend beyond national boundaries.  There are obvious incentives for free 
riding – a small country will inevitably benefit from the defence spending of a 
large, wealthy, friendly neighbour.  There is likely to be inefficient underprovision 
– by opting out of cost bearing the small country will also opt out of decision-
making and the resulting security is likely to suit it imperfectly.
84  Is this a case 
for making cost bearing and decision making trans-national, at least between 
countries with similar security interests?  It may be in New Zealand’s interests to 
free ride to some degree on Australia’s defence efforts, even though they will 
under-provide for our needs, if we can tolerate the costs to our reputation.
85  
Although Australia will provide the efficient amount of security for Australian 
needs, they could object to us free riding and, quite reasonably, use diplomatic 
pressure to stop us.  It may be more optimal for both countries to cooperate in 
terms of defence planning and cost bearing in a more integrated way than 
currently occurs. 
 
6.2.2  Informed decision making 
The relative balance between objective and subjective information is central in 
determining who is best placed to make decisions.  Subjective information refers 
to the preferences of those who will be affected by the decision.  If preferences 
vary a lot and are strongly held then there is a strong case for decision making to 
be devolved to the lowest possible level.  However, if preferences are relatively 
homogenous and unimportant and objective facts are important, then decision-
making would best be done by those who hold the objective information.   
Objective information could be held at various levels of government, but in the 
case of complex scientific information it is often higher levels of government that 
will have the resources and capability to access it.  This balance may become 
clearer if we think about an example. 
 
Health and safety standards for food products involve a lot of objective 
information.  It’s just a scientific fact that certain things are bad for human 
physiology.  Preferences are unlikely to vary much about the presence of certain 
toxic chemicals in food – cyanide is objectively very bad for us and we are 
unlikely to disagree about this.  The objective information about food standards 
is complex and advanced.  It is generally held at least at national government 
level, if not international.  Many countries defer to the American FDA because 
they lack the skill and scientific economies of scale to test everything. 
 
                                            
84   Conversely, if the large and powerful neighbour is a potential enemy rather than 
an ally, inefficient overprovision of security will occur as countries get locked into 
arms races. 
85  Although not totally – defence is an important private good for a nation as well as 
having international public good features.  Australia's defence interests and risks 
are not absolutely parallel to ours. They're a mid sized power; they have an Indian 
Ocean coastline; and they're closer to Indonesia/Timor/Irian Jaya /Bouganville 
than us. Furthermore, free riding may not be optimal if we think of our interests 
in a wide sense, as including reputational values.  
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However, subjective preferences are also important in setting food standards.   
Scientific information is incomplete and, in the absence of conclusive evidence, 
standards may be based on attitudes to risk.  These are like to be highly 
personal.  New Zealanders may have less appetite for risk than other nations, 
and risk preferences may vary significantly within New Zealand. 
 
This issue has been thrown into sharp focus in the GMO debate.  New Zealand 
sets its food standards in collaboration with Australia through the Australia New 
Zealand Food Authority (ANZFA).  Although we have special status as a separate 
state with regard to consultation, we otherwise have one vote on a panel of ten.  
Decision-making on food standards occurs at a level of governance higher than 
the nation state.  However, given the lack of hard evidence on the health effects 
of GMOs in food products and the fact that subjective risk preferences seem to 
be extremely important in this case, this seems to be an argument for keeping 
decision making, on this issue at least, firmly within New Zealand. 
 
6.2.3  Cost effective decision making 
Kerr et al refer to the costs of the decision making process.  Where costs are 
high and preferences are homogeneous there may be economies of scale from 
making one decision at a higher level and cutting out duplication.  This principle 
has less relevance to the international context than the national one since there 
will be fewer situations where preferences are homogeneous.  There may be 
some however.   
 
A certain absolute level of bureaucratic decision-making is a necessity for a 
sovereign state, whether the population is 3 million or 30 million.  For a country 
of 3 million, the bureaucracy has to be funded from a much smaller tax base.  
There may be some decisions that, rather than being made by the state, could 
be ‘borrowed’ from other countries, or made at an international level in cases 
where there are common priorities or perspectives.  Standards are costly to 
develop; there are economies of scale if we piggyback on larger units.  Niue and 
the Cook Islands provide good illustrations of small countries adopting other 
countries’ policies as a solution to the high marginal costs of having their own.  
Both are self-governing in free association with New Zealand, which means that 
New Zealand looks after their defence and external representation.  New Zealand 
is also a relatively small country.  It may be inefficient for us to make choices 
about absolutely everything.  The principle of cost effective decision-making 
reminds us that decision-making itself is costly.  How much decision-making do 
we want given our size?  How revolutionary and world leading do we want to be, 
given our size? 
 
In conclusion, we need to reassess our views on what should be decided at which 
level of government from a fresh perspective, that questions the presumption 
that the nation state is automatically the privileged level.  There are many 
innovative governance options that can co-exist to deal with different types of 
issues.  This section has proposed some examples of the sorts of issues that are 
likely to be contenders for international cooperation.  Applying the principles of 
balanced, informed and cost-effective decision-making is no simple matter; as 
always, costs and benefits need to be worked through on a case-by-case basis.   
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Attention will also need to be paid to issues of competence and accountability.  
This is an area ripe for further thinking. 
 
Summary:  Levels of Governance 
If we change our perspective and view all levels of political organisation as 
equal, without an automatic presumption toward the nation state, then 
decisions about when to enter into international agreements change.  Rather 
than trying to decide when New Zealand should give up some of its sovereignty 
to international fora, the question can be recast as an issue about subsidiarity: 
at what level of governance should decision-making be carried out. 
 
There are similarities, in principle, between consideration of devolution to 
lower levels of government and consideration of ‘devolution up’ to supranational 
levels of government.  The principles that guide decisions of devolution may 
also be applicable to decisions of international cooperation.  The paper has 
discussed the principles of balanced, informed and cost effective decision-
making in the international context. 
 
Decision-making at lower levels of government has the advantages of allowing 
for and respecting diversity in preferences, conditions and values across nation 
states, and increasing government accountability. 
 
Decision-making at trans-national levels of government may be optimal: 
 
•  Where there are externalities that cross national borders; 
•  To provide international or regional public goods; 
•  Where scientific objective information is important and hard to access; 
•  Where international preferences are homogeneous; 
•  Where decisions could be more cost effectively made by, or in 
cooperation with, others.  
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7.   Integration and Identity 
Sovereignty is closely linked to another notion – national identity.  A strong 
thread running through concerns about national sovereignty is the concern that 
our national identity w i l l  b e  t h r e a t e n e d  o r  l o s t  t h r o u g h  i n t e g r a t i o n  a n d  
globalisation. If sovereignty was hard to pin down, identity is even more so. 
 
Identity is the answers we give to the question “who am I?”  There are a 
multitude of answers to this question – individuals have many aspects to their 
identity: family, territory, class, religion, ethnicity, gender, occupation or 
profession, education, leisure activities, values and beliefs, and so on. 
 
Different aspects of our self may take precedence at different times and in 
different environments, and people will weigh the various aspects differently.   
Feminists may see their identity primarily in terms of their gender.  Marxists 
define themselves and others according to socio-economic class.  We have all 
met people who place great emphasis on their sport.  Some identify strongly with 
their locality or region, seeing themselves as a West Coaster, or an Aucklander.  
For others their ethnic group, even if members are spread over a number of 
regions, is their prime focus.  Religious and ethnic identities both strive to 
include more than one class, region, or gender within the communities they 
create around them.  The two have been closely related, potent sources of group 
identification throughout history.  In the modern era an enduring collective 
identity based on the category of the nation-state has emerged. 
 
The nation is particularly good at helping us with the question of who we are – it 
gives us rich and satisfying answers.  It offers a lot of identity markers with which 
we can orient ourselves.  Nations are associated with an historic territory or 
homeland.  In many, but not all, cases there is an ethnic bond of common 
descent.  It is likely that members share common historical myths, memories, 
symbols and traditions, which are manifest in a common mass public culture.  
Language, accents and particular expressions all serve to unite groups.  The idea 
of ‘being a New Zealander’ is layered with emotional complexity and meaning – it 
is hard to spell it out, but it gives us a sense of self and binds us to other New 
Zealanders.  National identity refers essentially to a psychological bond – it is a 




The concept of a ‘nation’ can be distinguished from that of a ‘state’.  A nation 
refers to a cultural, emotional bond.  A state is a political administrative 
arrangement – a bureaucratic subdivision of the world.  Over the last 200 years 
cultural communities based on nations have emerged as the preferred basis of 
political organisation: the nation-state has been the primary political unit of the 
modern world.  Emerging national identity has led to greater interest in national 
sovereignty. 
 
                                            
86   See Smith (1991) for further discussion.  
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We have talked about why globalisation might threaten sovereignty.  Let’s look at 
why globalisation might threaten national identity. 
 
7.1  The threat to national identity 
7.1.1  Trade in goods 
An argument that is sometimes advanced is that trade, in and of itself, erodes 
national identity.  Free trade changes the pressures on an economy.  Things in 
which a country specialised in the past may no longer be areas of comparative 
advantage.  If national identity is closely connected with this past way of life, and 
it becomes unsustainable, then trade is a threat. 
 
 
C’est la bonne vie 
Imagine a nation that traditionally had small farms of 20 odd cows, muddy 
lanes, stone walls, bicycles with baskets, and anyone could farm this way if 
they chose.  As the world modernised this style of farming turned out to be, 
not surprisingly, inefficient.  As international trade increased it turned out 
that other nations could farm much more efficiently and provide farm 
products at cheaper prices.  However, there remains the possibility that 
this nation may decide that the benefits of modernisation and openness do 
not outweigh the costs of losing this idyllic traditional lifestyle. 
 
Aspects of French identity are closely connected with a rural way of life.  
Although only about 8% of French people live on farms it has been 
estimated that up to 40% have some connection with rural lifestyles, 
through being related to a farmer, or living on a farm as a child, and many 
more have looser emotional connections with the countryside.
87  Preserving 
the rural lifestyle is a political objective in France and the French are 
primary supporters of the European Union’s common agricultural policy 
(CAP), which is aimed at supporting inefficient agriculture.  Concerns about 
the CAP aside
88, if a nation genuinely has a preference for preserving an 
element of their identity at the expense of some material well-being, this is 
not automatically as ‘irrational’ as some economists would maintain.
89 
 
Despite connection to place and traditional ways of life in parts of Europe, 
as well as generous EU subsidies, people are still choosing to move off the 
land.  It’s hard work to farm in the traditional way and people are attracted 
to the material benefits bestowed by technology and growth.  Governments 
may try and preserve history, but if affection for, and links to, tradition 




                                            
87   It would be interesting to compare this with New Zealand’s situation. 
88   And there are many.  It is an inefficient and distortionary means of achieving its 
stated goals. 
89   Although in this case it is not clear to what degree the French have a preference 
for support for agriculture – the French farm lobby is particularly powerful and 
may or may not represent wider national sentiment.  
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This type of argument does not seem to feature as largely in New Zealand.  Other 
than Maori, we are all very recent immigrants.  We have had less time to become 
attached to one, unchanging, way of life and greater geographical and 
occupational mobility.  In Europe, when they say “my family is from Perugia” 
they may mean for the last 1000 years!
90 
 
7.1.2  Global labour markets and the movement of people 
Concern about our national identity tends to be primarily associated with flows of 
people.  Immigration, over time, changes a nation’s identity.  Even if migrants 
assimilate well into the destination country’s existing culture, they bring with 
them new elements that, over time, become part of that culture.  If identity is 
about shared values and community of sentiment then inward flows of people, 
particularly from ethnic groups other than those currently dominant in New 
Zealand, may erode New Zealand values.  This concern is particularly felt if 
immigration has been rapid and sourced from ‘different’ groups.  The fear that 
immigration will erode national identity is compounded by the fear that outward 
flows, and in particular the ‘brain drain’, will hasten this change. 
 
New Zealand is not without control in defining the direction it would like to evolve 
in as a people.  We can and do respond to concerns about identity through 
immigration policy.  We choose whom we let in – who can become a New 
Zealander.  Historically we marketed ourselves in a way that attracted cultures 
that are likely to be compatible (although it could be argued that we are now 
doing this less).  These responses need to be weighed against the benefits of 
immigration to New Zealand, as discussed in Section 4. 
 
However, even in the absence of flows of people, identity may be threatened by 
flows of ideas.  While new ideas and innovation are key mechanisms through 
which the economic benefits of integration and openness are felt, they also 
provoke concern.  We fear becoming Americanised.  Information and 
communication technology have contributed to fears of cultural homogenisation 
and anonymity.  Responses to this include resistance to US spelling, lobbying for 
local content on TV, and so on. 
 
7.2  Some observations about national identity 
7.2.1  Identity is important 
It is clear that identity is important.  We seem to want to define ourselves – to 
have a sense of who we are.  We seem to want to feel that we belong to, and 
identify with, sub groups smaller than ‘all of humanity’.  There is a multitude of 
ways we do this; national identity is one that has been particularly powerful. 
 
Since national identity is important to New Zealanders, it is a legitimate policy 
concern.  It will function as a limiting parameter when considering how much 
                                            
90   The implication of this is that openness may have hit Maori harder.  The coming 
of the European can be viewed as Maori being exposed to the global economy.  
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policy integration is feasible, and with whom.  The arguments canvassed in this 
paper about the benefits of integration are not sufficient for further integration.  
In a democratic system high levels of policy integration can only occur to the 
degree that people feel comfortable with it; when they feel that there is a 
community of sentiment between current New Zealanders and future groups we 
might cooperate with.  
 
7.2.2  Identity is not always threatened by integration 
Although identity is important, it is a mistake to see all steps toward integration 
as threatening to identity.  There will not always be a trade off.  We have 
discussed the way market integration in the goods or labour markets might 
cause concerns.  But there will also be aspects of integration that allow us to 
maintain what matters of identity.  The effect on identity of policy integration will 
vary case by case. 
 
The relationship between identity and sovereignty is important to consider.   
Identity is currently strongly linked to the nation state, and also to sovereignty.  
However these links are neither necessary nor universal – they are a relatively 
recent phenomenon.  The age of nationalism began in Europe with the French 
Revolution.  Prior to this social organisation was based on agrarian social 
structures that were both smaller than nation state units (city states, feudal 
principalities) and larger (empires, both secular and religious).  The imperative 
that boundaries of political units and cultures converge is a thoroughly modern 
notion.  This implies that identity is possible without sovereignty and without 
nation states.  The fact that it is possible to retain a strong national identity 
while integrating political structures is already evident in the evolution of the 
European Union. 
 
7.2.3  Identity is dynamic 
Identity may be important, but it is also dynamic.  The whole idea that we have a  
clear ‘national identity’ that can be threatened and undermined is rather odd.  It 
assumes a very static view of who we are: that our identity is fixed to one point in 
time, often claimed to be the present, or some golden bygone age.  Preserving 
national identity therefore means freezing history.  But why is 1950’s New 
Zealand any more privileged than 2000 New Zealand, or 2050 New Zealand?  No 
one time is the ‘real’ New Zealand. 
  




The sari – a classic and unique symbol of Indian culture.  Right?  Yes and 
no… 
 
The contemporary wedding sari is machine embroidered and hand beaded.  
Machine embroidery is common throughout India but designs can be 
heavily influenced by textile traditions from Europe and England.  Beading 
was introduced into India in the nineteenth century from Africa. 
 
Parsi saris of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries used Chinese 
silk and motifs.  The Chinese origins were attributed to trade. 
 
The ‘kalga’ motif was derived from floral patterns, developed into a fertility 
symbol (since it was shaped like a mango), was adopted by the English in 
the nineteenth century, made famous in textile mills in Paisley, Scotland, 
and developed into the paisley designs common in Europe and the US. 
 
Cultural influences can absorb others and be absorbed.  Just because 
aspects of the sari came from Africa, China and Europe doesn’t make saris 
any less Indian.  Just because sari motifs were transformed into paisley 




Cultures are dynamic, evolving and changing over time with each new force or 
influence.  In stable periods of history cultures may remain unchanged for long 
periods and when cultural change happens it occurs gradually and organically so 
that we scarcely notice that customs and values are combining and assimilating 
and evolving.  In periods of transition and rapid change the evolution of culture 
troubles us more.  It’s less clear that all those in our borders share a community 
of sentiment.  Traditional life is disrupted and this sense of dislocation often 
results in even stronger calls for the preservation of national identity, as people 
search for stability.  Rapid change unsettles us because we don’t know who we 
are anymore. 
 
In the west, the past century has seen unprecedented social change reaching 
fundamental parts of our lives.  The changing role of women, and their 
movement from private to public domains, has had huge implications for the way 
women and men define their roles and identities in the family and society.  We 
are very much in a time of transformation and adjustment: the old certainties 
about ourselves and our relationships are increasingly less relevant, and we are 
struggling to develop new ways of thinking about ourselves.  Is it any wonder we 
are worried about identity? 
 
                                            
91   Example drawn from “Colour and Ritual: A Celebration of the Indian Sari”, Dowse 
Art Museum, Lower Hutt, 15 July – 8 Oct 2000  
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7.2.4  Change is not necessarily bad 
Cultural change may not only be inevitable, it may be a good thing.  Cultural 
diversity makes us much more cosmopolitan.  A multi-cultural society may make 
us more open and tolerant of difference.  Immigrants bring fresh ideas and 
perspectives, which have economic and social benefits.  Many of those who seem 
to be part of the brain drain in fact return.  Travel has allowed New Zealanders to 
spot enterprise opportunities and to expand the tastes and horizons of those who 
stay at home.  It’s not clear that it is desirable for most of the population of a 
small country to remain within it. 
 
7.2.5  National identity is not necessarily good 
Any discussion of national identity needs to include a cautionary note.  Some 
sense of belonging seems to be a fundamental human need and we therefore 
tend to think of national identity as a good thing.  We think, warmly, of the 
relaxed kiwi lifestyle; of baches and marmite and gumboots and ingenuity (or 
whatever romantic version of kiwiana that particularly inspires you). 
 
However national identity has a dark side: nationalism.  National sentiment is a 
powerful force and when directed against people identified as ‘not belonging’, 
whether they are within a nation’s borders or outside, can become particularly 
nasty. 
 
In the name of ‘national identity’ people have allegedly been willing to surrender their 
own liberties and curtail those of others.  They have been prepared to trample on the civil 
and religious rights of ethnic, racial and religious minorities whom the nation could not 
absorb. … The ideal of the nation, transplanted across the globe from its Western 
heartlands, has brought with it confusion, instability, strife and terror, particularly in 
areas of mixed ethnic and religious character.  Nationalism … offers a narrow, conflict-
laden legitimation for political community, which inevitably pits culture-communities 
against each other.92 
 
Whether national identity is positive or negative might depend on whether it is 
inclusive or exclusive.  1930s Nazi Germans defined their identity in terms of an 
ethnically exclusive club and then proceeded to ‘purify’ their nation internally as 
well as expand externally.  Colonial European powers expressed their nationalism 
through imperialism.  Former Yugoslavia has long seen nationalistic conflict, and 
most recently ‘ethnic cleansing’, resulting from competing cultures in 
overlapping geographical areas all asserting that they are the authentic culture, 
and therefore nation, in the land.  This contrasts with American national identity 
which, although passionate, is inclusive and adaptive – people of many ethnic 
and cultural groups can, and have, become Americans.  This is also true of New 
Zealand.  In the end, however, all groups define their identity in contrast to 
others, so national identity may, at its core, be a fundamentally antagonistic 
notion. 
 
Nationalism has been a powerful force because national identity has been, and 
continues to be, particularly good at helping us answer the question of who we 
                                            
92   Smith (1991), 17-18  
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are.  It bestows a sense of security and belonging that we value.  However 
nationalism becomes a dangerous force when individuals and governments 
decide that national identity is the overwhelming policy objective.  European 
experience differs significantly from the situations facing New Zealand.   
Nevertheless, there are lessons for us.  To the extent that the state adopts a role 
in promoting national identity, it is important that an inclusive and adaptive New 
Zealand be promoted.  Furthermore, the state must be aware of the risk that, 
even if it promotes an inclusive national identity, not all New Zealanders will 
interpret these messages in such a tolerant and open way. 
 
7.3  New Zealand as a nation or a region: the challenge 
Powerful new economic, political and cultural forces are shaping tomorrow’s 
world.  Transport and communication technology has fundamentally altered the 
world we live in.  Mobility of people around the globe is unlikely to cease.  The 
perspective of the world as containing isolated and self-contained nation states 
has long since ceased to bear much resemblance to reality.  This has led some 
to speculate that we are seeing the end of the age of nationalism.  Nation states 
will be eroded by the twin forces of increasing internationalism and increasing 
devolution to regions. 
 
Others argue that, despite growing global interdependencies, we are a long way 
from witnessing the eclipse of the nation state.  Collective identity at the nation 
state level will continue to command humanity’s allegiances for a long time to 
come.
93  Whether we continue to operate primarily through the nation state lens, 
or move to a more regional perspective, we face a challenging future. 
 
If nation states decline in importance, and we lose a strong sense of New 
Zealand identity, we will still be faced with the basic need for answers to the 
question ‘who am I?’  We may retain a concept of New Zealandness – our identity 
is in part conferred by our physical isolation, and we will always have this even 
without the nation state.  Alternatively we will look to other aspects of our 
identity to answer this.  We may see the rise of South Island identity perhaps, or 
Australasian identity, or class-based identity, or others.  In this changing world 
we will need new ways of generating the security and sense of belonging that 
comes with national cultural identity.  In the end all cultures will be left with a 
challenge: how do we foster an evolving sense of identity in a world of increasing 
mobility and merging of cultural influence? 
 
If New Zealand the nation state retains its primacy in terms of demarcating our 
community of allegiance, and continues to be able to provide us with a cohesive 
sense of self, we still have to deal with the effects of mobility and globalisation.  
One option is that the State step up its traditional role of reinforcing and 
encouraging a sense of identification with symbols of public culture, through 
mass education and the media.  Although there are likely to be welfare gains 
through an increased sense of belonging, it will be important to manage the risk 
of an intolerant or exclusive sense of national identity developing. 
                                            
93   See Smith (1991)  
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Summary:  Identity 
Identity, a sense of who we are, seems to be important to us.  There is a 
multitude of ways that we define ourselves; national identity is one that has 
been particularly powerful. 
 
To the extent that we value it, national identity represents a limiting parameter 
for policy.  Policy integration can only occur to the degree that people feel 
comfortable with it.  However, not all steps toward integration threaten national 
identity – there is not necessarily a trade off. 
 
Identity is dynamic.  Identity and culture have always evolved over time.   
Change can be beneficial in terms of opening New Zealand to new ideas and 
different perspectives, which may make us more tolerant as well as innovative.   
It may be the rapid speed of evolution in culture and identity that causes us 
particular dislocation and concern. 
 
National identity can also be negative.  Nationalism has been a powerful and 
destructive force when directed against those identified as not belonging.  It is 
important that any promotion of New Zealand national identity be inclusive and 
adaptive. 
 
Whether or not the nation-state remains a primary focus of identity, we will 
have to deal with the effects of mobility and globalisation.  The challenge for 
the future is: how do we foster an evolving sense of identity in a world of 
increasing mobility and merging of cultural influence?  
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8.   Conclusions and Implications for Policy 
8.1  Costs and benefits of market integration 
In order to assess what level of integration is optimal for New Zealand we need to 
understand the effects of integration on the living standards of New Zealanders.  
This paper has attempted to identify costs and benefits of integration across 
goods, services, capital and labour markets in terms of both material, and less 
tangible, aspects of living standards.  Figure 5 summarises the key elements in 
our analysis. 
 
Government is acting in an environment in which its power and influence is 
limited; globalisation is something that governments can influence only at the 
margin.  Nevertheless, government is not without choices and these choices can 
make a big difference to New Zealanders’ welfare even in this, largely reactive, 
field.  Being clear about benefits and costs of market integration should help 
clarify our objectives.   
 
That said, there are many things government can’t influence.  To a significant 
degree, thinking about external economic policy should be viewed in the context 
of thinking about how to manage the implications and consequences of a 
process largely outside our control.  In these areas ‘costs and benefits’ are better 
thought of as ‘positive and negative implications of integration’ that will need to 
be managed. 
 
Figure 5: Costs and Benefits 
 Benefits  Costs 
Incomes  Greater productivity and 
higher incomes through: 
better resource allocation; 
scale, scope and 
specialisation; technological 
advance; accumulation of 
human and physical capital; 
firm organisation and 
management practices; and 
plant/firm turnover. 
Particularly important for a 
small isolated economy like 
New Zealand. 
Risk that activity will be more 
likely to locate offshore and New 
Zealanders remaining in New 
Zealand will not capture the 




May contribute to narrower 
income distribution and less 
inequality. 
 
Access to lower priced goods 
disproportionately benefits 
those on lower incomes. 
May contribute to wider income 
distribution and more 
inequality. 
 
Costs may be concentrated on 
particular sectors that are no 
longer competitive.  Some 
individuals, groups and regions 
will be worse off.  
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Decision making  Opportunity for more efficient 
governance in some areas. 
Difficult governance trade-offs 
to be made. 
 




Identity  Opportunity for alternative 
forms of identity less closely 
linked with the nation state. 
Dislocation as rapid change 
disturbs traditional views of 




8.2  How do we decide the matter? 
The question this paper has been attempting to address is: how integrated do we 
wish to be?  We have identified key considerations that might influence the 
answer.  However, reaching a definitive judgement about their relative weights is 
not possible because it involves empirical uncertainties and political judgements. 
 
Empirical uncertainties 
Integration is good for productivity.  However, much of the analysis about the 
productivity advantages of integration hinges on how seriously we view the risk 
that economic activity will locate offshore as factor markets free up, and how 
much we can influence this.  We lack the data to make a firm judgement. 
 
•  A particular development priority is work aimed at understanding the 
nature of capital and labour mobility between New Zealand and other 
countries. Do firms and people move?  What influences their location 
decisions?  How strong are the border effects keeping activity in New 
Zealand? 
 
Other areas that would inform an assessment of the costs and benefits for New 
Zealand include work on the levels of density needed for various firm activities, 
and the response of firms to technology – does technology lead to dispersion or 
further agglomeration? 
 
Concerns about income distribution centre on the fact that some will suffer as a 
result of a changed environment.  How much of a problem this is may depend, to 
a large degree, on the speed of labour market adjustment.  This is another area 
for further work. 
 
•  How effectively do labour market adjustment mechanisms work after a 
shock?  Is the dislocation temporary or permanent?  Do people retrain 
and/or move within New Zealand in order to find employment? 
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Political judgements 
At the centre of the analysis lie matters of value.  They cannot be resolved by 
applying economic analysis.  They concern the preferences and attitudes of New 
Zealanders and should be vigorously debated in the public sphere and decided 
through the political process.  What are we optimising for?  Who and what do we 
care about?  People or places?  Which people?  Which places? 
 
We have identified mobility of capital and labour as a risk, particularly in terms 
of outflows.  However, how we think about this depends on whom we ‘count’.  
Those who relocate offshore will presumably be benefiting a lot from openness, 
whereas those remaining in New Zealand may suffer.  If we include the welfare of 
all New Zealanders wherever they may reside, then there will be distributional 
effects, but it is less clear that loss of activity is, automatically, a bad thing. 
 
•  Do we care about the welfare and living standards of all New Zealand 
citizens, including those located outside New Zealand?  Or should our 
policies be aimed at New Zealand residents? 
 
•  Do we value the prosperity of ‘this nation’ and ‘this land’ over and above 
the welfare of New Zealanders within and outside its physical borders? 
 
Labour market adjustment may mitigate the ‘winners and losers’ problem 
regarding income distribution amongst individuals and groups.  Their misfortune 
may be transitional.  However, for regions within New Zealand, change is likely to 
be more serious. 
 
•  Do we care about places as well as people?  Do we value the prosperity of 
regions within New Zealand over and above the welfare of New Zealand 
people?  If we do, how much are we prepared to forgo to support them? 
 
We are witnessing trends of devolution to lower levels of government as well as 
increasing international cooperation.  Political units seem to be getting smaller 
while economic units are getting larger.  Although issues of the appropriate level 
of governance may be informed by analysis and theory, a large element of this is 
also a political judgement. 
 
•  In what areas, and to what degree, is it important to New Zealanders to 
retain decision-making power? 
 
•  In what areas, and to whom, are we comfortable with relinquishing some 
control for a greater gain? 
 
Value judgements cut to the heart of our identity. 
 
•  How do we see ourselves?  What does it mean to be a New Zealander?  
What level of integration are New Zealanders comfortable with, and with 
whom?   
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•  How do we foster an evolving sense of national identity in a world of 
increasing mobility and merging of cultural influence? 
 
•  National identity can be a negative as well as a positive force.  In a 
changing world, should we even be aiming to base our identity on a 
concept of the nation state? 
 
8.3  Implications for policy questions 
Applying the insights about costs and benefits of integration to concrete policy 
choices facing officials and Ministers is vital further work.  This work will need to 
draw on analysis of global economic and political trends to determine what 
might be achievable.  An in-depth treatment of policy is outside the scope of this 
paper.  We hope that others will take up the challenge. 
 
The following section identifies key ideas that shape the analysis of policy and 
illustrates them with some current policy questions.  It foreshadows more 
expansive work, combining policy objectives canvassed in this paper with 
practical considerations, to better illuminate policy choices. 
 
8.3.1  Identify goals and objectives 
The first rule of policy – be clear about your objectives when formulating policy.  
This sounds obvious, but it is too easy to become immersed in strategies and 
policy details and discussions about what we can and cannot do, and lose sight 
of what we want to do.  We need to keep in mind the questions: 
 
•  What level of integration makes sense for New Zealand in an increasingly 
open global economy? 
•  On balance, would further integration serve our interests? 
 
8.3.2  Make linkages across policy areas 
This paper has attempted to approach issues of integration in new and broader 
ways.  We look at integration across all markets rather than just focusing on 
trade.  We look wider than just economic theories of productivity – living 
standards are about a lot more than this.  We take a spatial perspective as well 
as a traditional ‘nation state’ perspective.   
 
It is important to understand the full impact of policy decisions, and drawing out 
the linkages between policy areas helps us do that in a more explicit way.  If we 
make changes to immigration policy, for example, we need to be aware that it 
may have effects on the flow of goods and services and capital as well as labour.  
When formulating policy advice we must ask ourselves: 
 
•  What are the implications of policy options on the goods, services, capital 
and labour markets? 
•  What are the implications of policy options on the range of elements that 
contribute to living standards? 
•  What are the implications of policy options on the location of activity? 
•  Have we taken into account mobility of capital and people?  
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Thinking Broadly 
In a recent speech
94, Hon Dr Cullen mentioned the idea of an “Australia 
strategy”.  This paints a picture of New Zealand thinking about its 
relationship with Australia across policy areas, and beyond purely 
economic considerations.  It suggests a perspective of New Zealand and 
Australia as a region sharing a great deal of common ground and highlights 




8.3.3  Recognise what we can’t control 
In many domains further integration is inevitable.  Every day individuals and 
businesses are making decisions and taking actions that cross national borders.  
The appropriate response from government is to be realistic about what the 
trends are, and identify what can and cannot be influenced.  In the case of 
aspects of integration outside government control, policy responses are better 
framed in terms of how to deal with the consequences for, and impact on, New 
Zealanders. 
 
Issues of national identity are a prime example.  Identity is something that is 
subtle, intangible and not at all easily influenced by governments.  It is always a 
fluid socially constructed phenomenon, but rapid change brings dislocation as 
traditional sources of identity are disturbed.  A rapidly changing world is not 
something the government can control or stop.  Disturbances in feelings of 
identity are also not easy to address, although the government may be able to 
play a role in trying to ease the transition through, perhaps, signalling a multi-
cultural global identity for New Zealand. 
 
It is important to subject policy choices to the following questions: 
 
•  Do we have any control over what is happening? 
•  For those things that are beyond government influence, what can we do to 
maximise the benefits for New Zealanders and minimise the costs?  How 
can we capitalise best on the inevitable? 
                                            
94   Address to Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu & the Council for Economic Development of 
Australia, Melbourne, 9 August 2000  
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Can’t stop those people 
Skilled labour is highly mobile – talented people have the ability to move 
internationally, regardless of what the New Zealand government does.     
Unskilled labour is also pretty mobile, at least to Australia.  The movement 
of people across borders can raise some tricky policy problems. 
 
For example, a young New Zealander finishes university with a $30,000 
student loan and then moves to the US to work.  Should the New Zealand 
government be able to recover loans from citizens while they are overseas 
in the same way they do for citizens within New Zealand?  How would we go 
about this? 
 
Another interesting policy issue concerns superannuation.  Should a retired 
New Zealander be able to take their super entitlement with them if they 
move overseas in their retirement?  Or, if someone has spent a 
considerable amount of their working life overseas, should they be entitled 
to super payments on their return to New Zealand? 
 
And tax rates – does increasing mobility of people mean that there is 
increased pressure for lower income tax rates?   
 
Returning to a closed economy is no longer an option; technology, 
communications and the global economy have changed too much.  People 
are mobile and this is likely to continue.  Policies based in the nation state 
paradigm will therefore come under increasing pressure to change in the 




8.3.4  Identify where we do have choices 
Despite the, sometimes overwhelming, lack of influence government has on 
integration we do have choices.  There are a number of dimensions across which 
government can act to oil the wheels or put sand in the wheels of continuing 
integration. 
 
We have choices about policy area.  Options include: tariffs, non-tariff barriers, 
regulations and legal systems, competition policy, monetary policy, fiscal policy, 
investment regime, immigration policy, and the physical infrastructure. 
 
We have choices about level of engagement with other countries.  The options 
are generally characterised in terms of unilateral, bilateral, regional and 
multilateral tracks.  By definition, we have a great deal of control over our 
unilateral choices.  Multilateral forums, at the other extreme, are time-
consuming, fraught with disagreement, and leave most individual nations with 
very little control.  Countries persist because the gains, when they come, can be 
high particularly for small nations like New Zealand.  Acting in consort, or free 
riding, are also options. 
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If we engage bilaterally or regionally with other countries we have choices about 
how far to go.  Options might include: free trade agreements, customs unions, 
c o m m o n  m a r k e t s ,  e c o n o m i c  u n i o n s  o r  e ve n  p o l i t i c a l  u n i o n .   W e  a l s o  h a ve  t o  
decide with whom we engage, and when.  Finally we have choices about which 
sectors agreements might cover. Obviously these bilateral and regional decisions 
are highly dependent on having a likeminded partner/s.  What we can 
realistically achieve must inform what we seek to achieve. 
 
Policy questions include: 
 
•  Which policy area/s? 
•  What level of engagement with other countries? 
•  How far? 
•  With whom? 
•  Which sectors? 
 
Money money money 
If we decide to oil the wheels of integration, there are a number of tools 
that are under the control of government.  Monetary policy is one that has 
received considerable attention in recent times. 
 
Monetary policy integration can offer a reduction in transaction costs and 
uncertainty when dealing with another country.  Integration can take the 
form of a system of fixed exchange rates between countries, or an 
irrevocably fixed system such as a common currency or the adoption of 
another country’s currency.  There are also costs associated with losing 
control of monetary policy as a policy instrument.  The general theory 
behind monetary policy integration argues that such regimes are most 
appropriate for areas closely integrated through trade and factor 
movements.  The optimal size of the currency area depends on the trade-off 
of microeconomic efficiency against macroeconomic flexibility
95.  New 
theoretical developments also suggest that there are benefits from a 
common currency deriving from reducing exchange rate variability.  Studies 
have been done on the costs and benefits of New Zealand forming a 






It is clear that there are many policy options that may affect our objectives.   
Once we have sorted areas in which government is basically a responder from 
areas it can influence, we are still left with a wide range of policy options.  Not 
unlimited choice, but much wider than the resources of a country of 3.8 million 
people can support. 
 
                                            
95   See Coleman (1999) for a discussion of economic integration and monetary 
union. 
96   See Grimes & Holmes (2000)  
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It is necessary to prioritise.  We want to know which policies, what types of 
international agreements, with whom, and covering what, will provide the biggest 
benefits for New Zealand at the least cost. 
 
The answers to these questions are difficult, depending not only on being clear 
about objectives and domestic preferences but also on the complex and ever-
shifting international political and economic environment.  This has been 
identified as the subject for follow-on work. 
 




Who are we interested in? 
The question of with whom New Zealand should pursue economic relations 
is clearly one where strict prioritisation is vital.  We need to assess the 
strategic importance of various relationships, both actual and possible. 
 
Currently New Zealand has a very close relationship with Australia and has 
recently signed a closer economic partnership agreement with Singapore.  
New Zealand also has close ties with some Pacific nations and is a member 
of APEC.  We also consider the multilateral WTO process of central 
importance. 
 
One important question to answer is whether the gains are larger from 
continuing to integrate with current close partners such as Australia or 
from having lower levels of integration with a larger number of partners.  
One might conclude from the material in this paper that the marginal gains 
from integration are highest at the lower levels of integration, and so New 
Zealand would get the most ‘bang from its buck’ by pursuing free trade 
a g r e e m e n t s ,  s a y ,  w i t h  m a n y  d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s .   H o w e v e r ,  w e  h a v e  a l s o  
seen that policy integration is more likely to yield benefits where there are 
high levels of social integration, implying we should focus on countries 
most similar to us.  Furthermore, there are sunk costs involved in 
negotiating agreements with other countries which may make it easier and 
cheaper to extend relationships with current partners, even though the 
benefits may be less.  As a small country it is important that we not over-
diversify in terms of the relationships we are able to maintain.  There is no 
point in spreading ourselves too thin and failing to make an impact 
anywhere because our effort was inadequately focused. 
 
It will be important to develop criteria to inform this issue.  Criteria would 
depend on the policy issue.  Candidates for goods market integration might 
be filtered according to, for example, the size of their economy, prospects 
of social integration, political factors, view of future trade bloc 
arrangements etc.  Criteria for capital market/currency area integration 
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8.3.6  Think harder about trade-offs between ‘first best’ domestic options vs. 
options that facilitate integration 
There are costs and benefits to being different.  Difference allows New Zealand to 
have its own preferences exactly reflected in policy.  It also allows policies to be 
fine-tuned to the New Zealand environment so that they are ‘first-best’.  However, 
different policies can sometimes be a barrier to integration, not least because 
they are less likely to be well understood outside New Zealand.  There may be a 
trade-off, in some instances, between having ideal policy from a domestic point 
of view, and having ideal policy from an integration point of view. 
 
•  Thinking harder about the trade-offs between the costs and benefits of 
being different is an important area for development.  Have we viewed 
policy options from the perspective of ‘New Zealand in the world’ as well 





Costs of being different are evident in a recent case concerning takeover 
codes.  A Japanese brewer bought shares in Lion Nathan belonging to key 
board interests, and some other players,  at above market price, and 
secured control.  Some of the Australian fund managers were left as 
minority holders without the option of selling their shares at that price.   
They were critical of New Zealand law, arguing that this is why they had not 
secured the offer price themselves. 
 
We have chosen our system of regulations because we believe it is best for 
us.  However there is a danger that, because we are small, people don’t 
spend much time researching our market.  Although big shareholders 
understood our rules very well, some foreign investors, in the absence of 
any further information, are likely to assume we are like others.  If this 
occurs, and investors are caught out, it may ultimately harm investment in 
New Zealand.  We would be well advised to consider this global perspective 




If we decide the advantages of being the same as others are convincing, there 
are various methods we can use to synchronise policies.  One is harmonisation, 
where a common policy is adopted between countries.  Another possibility is 
mutual recognition, where each country maintains its own policy but will accept 
the policy of the partner country.  Other options include unilateral adoption of 
another countries regulations. 
 
Australia and New Zealand have utilised both mutual recognition and 
harmonisation.  The Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Agreement (TTMRA) 
provides that goods that can be legally sold in one country can be sold in the 
other, and that people who are registered to carry out an occupation in one 
                                            
97   Example drawn from a seminar given by Credit Suisse First Boston.  
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country are entitled to practice an equivalent occupation in the other.  The 
Australia New Zealand Food Authority (ANZFA), by contrast, have opted for 
harmonisation, and common food standards for both countries are determined 
jointly.  The European Union has largely gone for mutual recognition, in part 
because of the enormous difficulty in negotiating shared standards among a 
large number of nations. 
 
8.3.7  Keep an open mind about location of decision making 
The paper has argued that we shouldn’t assume that the nation state is 
automatically the optimal level of decision-making.  In many cases it will be.  But 
there may be some situations in which international co-operation is desirable.  
How much national policy choice should we give up to gain the benefits of policy 
integration?  Further work is required to put a framework around criteria for 
location of decision-making. 
 
•  How do we think more clearly about the benefits and costs of signing up 
to international agreements? 
 
•  What are appropriate domestic processes to ensure that decisions to 
cooperate internationally are made competently and in consideration of 
all relevant information and preferences? 
 
8.4 Key  themes 
Integration is happening, whether we like it or not.  This presents both 
opportunities and risks for New Zealand’s future economic performance and has 
implications for income distribution, regional distribution, governance and 
identity.  Issues about how New Zealand should respond will still face us in five 
to ten years time, and are likely to become more pressing.  As such, a careful 
analysis of where New Zealand’s interests lie, and its implications for policy, is a 
matter of strategic importance.  
 
Government is acting in an environment in which its power and influence is 
limited; globalisation is something that governments can influence only at the 
margin.  It can oil the wheels or put sand in the wheels of integration – it cannot 
drive the machine.  Whilst governments can hasten or hinder the pace of 
integration much of their role will be around responding to the implications of 
integration.  We need to understand where government has choices, where it 
doesn’t, and what the benefits, costs and implications are. 
 
Applying an understanding of the costs and benefits of integration to policy 
choices is not straightforward.  We are operating in an environment of 
uncertainty, making conclusions difficult.  Integration is likely to bring significant 
benefits to a small country like New Zealand.  However we need to know more 
about capital and labour mobility to evaluate the risk that activity will locate 
offshore. 
 
Furthermore, at the heart of an evaluation of costs and benefits of integration lie 
value judgements that go beyond calculations of economic welfare.  An economic  
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perspective is crucial in informing these judgements; but the judgements 
themselves are broader.  The paper has identified political judgements that need 
to be made in the areas of location of people and activity, levels of governance, 
and identity.  
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APPENDIX 1: Input Accumulation 
Galt (2000) finds there is no international consensus about appropriate 
theoretical models of growth.  Various theoretical approaches include: 
 
•  Neoclassical growth models, which suggest that accumulation of factors, 
such as capital, labour and human capital, should raise output levels over 
time but with diminishing returns.  In the long term this means any burst 
in additional factor accumulation will be temporary, even if leading to a 
higher income level.  Growth can be boosted persistently through 
exogenous factors such as improvements in technology. 
 
•  Endogenous growth models, which suggest that growth may be able to 
continue indefinitely, with contributions from phenomena such as 
technical change being embodied in the capital stock; human capital 
investments; R&D spillovers; economies of scale or increased 
specialisation in intermediate inputs. 
 
Other theorists suggest that the nature of the institutions and culture in a 
society; the role and size of Government; macroeconomic conditions and many 
other matters may contribute to growth performance. 
 
This paper has focused on the type of effects described in the endogenous 
growth literature.  These effects are of particular interest as they can lead to 
consistent long-term growth. Our position, that a focus on productivity is more 
important, hinges on beliefs that improving productivity will increase growth, 
incomes and employment to a greater degree, and for longer, than simply 
accumulating factors of production. 
 
Nevertheless, input accumulation has been a significant factor in the initial 
growth of countries.  For instance, many authors regard the East Asian 
economies as good examples of the benefits factor accumulation can bring in the 
early stages of development.  For this reason this appendix briefly discusses 
some of the key ideas surrounding the accumulation of labour and capital.   
 
The link between the level of productive inputs and the achievable level of output 
is relatively obvious.  In almost any business, productive capacity can be made 
larger by increasing one or more key inputs.  Note that this does not mean 
increasing any input will increase output – it is only true for the subset of inputs 
that are constraining productive capacity at that time.  These inputs may also 
need to be of a certain quality.  
 
Expanding the stock of labour 
There is a range of ways to increase the size of the labour force over the longer-
term: higher birth rates; lower death, sickness and accident rates; higher levels 
of labour force participation (for example, of the unemployed or women); and 
higher levels of immigration.  All of these will lead to higher levels of economic 
output.  To the extent that the changes are ongoing (e.g. sickness and accident  
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rates are improved by 1% a year, each year) they will lead to sustained higher 
growth. 
 
It should be noted, however, that in most developed economies it is the 
availability of high quality labour that constrains productive capacity, rather than 
the quantity.  This is why it is important to focus on the human capital aspect of 
labour.  Education and training approaches are particularly important, as 
discussed earlier in the paper. 
 
Also, while the methods that involve increasing the total workforce will increase 
the aggregate level of a country's output, they may not necessarily increase the 
level of output per person (i.e. labour productivity).  It is also worth noting that 
as countries become wealthier, their labour force participation rates can fall (as 
can the average level of hours worked by those in employment) as some of the 
higher income is taken as leisure. 
 
Accumulation of physical capital 
The level of physical capital in an economy can be augmented by higher levels of 
domestic saving and by tapping into the saving of foreigners. 
 
Currently in New Zealand domestic saving and foreign saving contribute fairly 
equally to new investment.  Note that the level of foreign saving in the economy 
corresponds to the current account balance.  There are often debates over 
whether domestic saving should be actively encouraged in order to stimulate 
growth, and reduce reliance on foreign sources of saving.  However, the empirical 
evidence to date suggests that while higher growth may lead to higher domestic 
saving, higher domestic saving does not necessarily seem to lead to higher 
growth.  A cross-section view of countries domestic saving rates and growth 
performance reveals no discernable pattern.  For example in the United States, 
domestic savings have fallen over the past two decades while growth rates and 
output have steadily risen.  In addition there does not seem to be a limit to how 
long a country can rely on the savings of others.  Countries such as Australia and 
New Zealand have run current account deficits for many years.   
 
The effect of increasing the level of physical capital, say by raising the savings 
rate, is to provide a temporary boost to growth.  This occurs as the economy 
moves to a higher level of output with its larger stock of capital.  Per capita 




                                            
98   See for example Barro & Sala-I-Martin (1995)  
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